Wir sind des Paulus schwarzer Haufen, or what if Friedrich Paulus overthrew the SED regime during the East German uprising of 1953?

Let's say that Friedrich Paulus takes the protestors' side during the East German uprising of 1953 and organises a military coup against the SED. Could this maybe lead to more daring uprisings in the Eastern Block that makes it hard for the Soviets to put down the new regime? And if the Soviets backs off, could then the new regime maybe abandon Soviet-style Communism alltogether and instead either reunite with the West or becoming Nazi, Strasserist or Monarchist?
 
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Let's say that Friedrich Paulus takes the protestors' side during the East German uprising of 1953 and organises a military coup against the SED. Could this maybe lead to more daring uprisings in the Eastern Block that makes it hard for the Soviets to put down the new regime? And if the Soviets backs off, could then the new regime maybe abandon Soviet-style Communism alltogether and instead either reunite with the West or becoming Nazi, Strasserist or Monarchist?
The Soviets aren't going to let their puppet go away so easily, Czechoslovakia and Hungary know what happens when you deviate from Soviet style communism.
 
Let's say that Friedrich Paulus takes the protestors' side during the East German uprising of 1953 and organises a military coup against the SED. Could this maybe lead to more daring uprisings in the Eastern Block that makes it hard for the Soviets to put down the new regime? And if the Soviets backs off, could then the new regime maybe abandon Soviet-style Communism alltogether and instead either reunite with the West or becoming Nazi, Strasserist or Monarchist?
He would reunite with the west

That being said, the soviets would declare him a nazi, invade east Germany and restore the occupation zone for a few more years, expect a ton of people shot
 
Paulus would be ousted and executed quickly. Probably he can't even get that far when some information would be leaked to ears of Kremlin before he can even launch coup.
 
Paulus was still under house arrest in the USSR when the uprising went down. He also was a somewhat controversial figure in the armed forces such as they were and under constant surveillance as someone not entirely trusted even after his release for a number of reasons (his indecisiveness in changing sides, his children living in the FRG, the fact that he was prevented from seeing his dying wife among other reasons)
Furthermore the KVP, the predecessor of the NVA, proved loyal too the regime, but barely operational: equipment was lacking, planning was lacking, communication spotty and allegedly at times the units "in the field" during the uprising were not supplied with food.

If you want a regime change in the aftermath of June 17, your best bets are Otto Grotewohl and Wilhelm Zaisser. Both would still be Soviet controlled regimes, but notably different ones.

Grotewohl was originally an SPD member, ultimately supported the founding of the SED and became minister president of the GDR. In that role he was somewhat powerless between the party leadership and the Soviet Military Administration. But he was generally well regarded by the military administration and an open advocate for more humane, law-bound governance. He also was the public face of the government when calming the situation. As such on the height of the uprising the Soviets considered replacing Ulbricht with him as the true power in the GDR. Once the situation calmed down that idea was shelfed, probably because he was not a reliable Communist. But maybe a bit more instability could tilt things his way.

Wilhelm Zaisser otoh was a very well connected Communist, his connections in Moscow reaching back to the 1920s. For that reason he was put in control of the Stasi over less trusted Mielke. Somewhat ironically he became affiliated with the more liberal SED wing in the central Committee. In conjunction with another member, Rudolf Herrnstadt (who had been urged on by the Soviet ambassador), he initiated a standoff with Ulbricht in the Central Committee and Ulbricht only got support from Honecker and Herrmann Matern. Unfortunately he they did not know that Beria had been ousted in the meantime. Ulbricht went to Moscow and got the new government to back him by painting Zaisser and his allies as Beria allies and implying their proposed course would be seen as admission of weakness. Better timing vis-a-vis Moscow events or a bolder approach, where the power change was made public before Ulbricht went to Moscow might have been more successful.
 
If you want a regime change in the aftermath of June 17, your best bets are Otto Grotewohl and Wilhelm Zaisser. Both would still be Soviet controlled regimes, but notably different ones.

Grotewohl was originally an SPD member, ultimately supported the founding of the SED and became minister president of the GDR. In that role he was somewhat powerless between the party leadership and the Soviet Military Administration. But he was generally well regarded by the military administration and an open advocate for more humane, law-bound governance. He also was the public face of the government when calming the situation. As such on the height of the uprising the Soviets considered replacing Ulbricht with him as the true power in the GDR. Once the situation calmed down that idea was shelfed, probably because he was not a reliable Communist. But maybe a bit more instability could tilt things his way.

Wilhelm Zaisser otoh was a very well connected Communist, his connections in Moscow reaching back to the 1920s. For that reason he was put in control of the Stasi over less trusted Mielke. Somewhat ironically he became affiliated with the more liberal SED wing in the central Committee. In conjunction with another member, Rudolf Herrnstadt (who had been urged on by the Soviet ambassador), he initiated a standoff with Ulbricht in the Central Committee and Ulbricht only got support from Honecker and Herrmann Matern. Unfortunately he they did not know that Beria had been ousted in the meantime. Ulbricht went to Moscow and got the new government to back him by painting Zaisser and his allies as Beria allies and implying their proposed course would be seen as admission of weakness. Better timing vis-a-vis Moscow events or a bolder approach, where the power change was made public before Ulbricht went to Moscow might have been more successful.
This is an interesting idea!
How much would and could GDR policies really change, though? Maybe a few churches don't get demolished, maybe the RIAS Trials don't end with death penalties - but on the whole, it would still be very recognisably the dictatorship we know, wouldn't it?
 
Let's say that Friedrich Paulus takes the protestors' side during the East German uprising of 1953 and organises a military coup against the SED. Could this maybe lead to more daring uprisings in the Eastern Block that makes it hard for the Soviets to put down the new regime? And if the Soviets backs off, could then the new regime maybe abandon Soviet-style Communism alltogether and instead either reunite with the West or becoming Nazi, Strasserist or Monarchist?

There is no scenario where this ends with an independent East Germany or anything other than the reimposition of a Soviet approved government. First of all the balance of military force is overwhelmingly on the Soviet side with about 600,000 troops in the occupation army (it didn't become the GSFG until 1954) and millions more on hand, secondly while some lower ranking soldiers did show some sympathy to the protestors the entire Soviet leadership both civilian and military have very, very fresh memories of the war, German independence is not acceptable. Finally Western intervention isn't coming, the 1953 ceasefire in Korea is 1 month away from being signed and the Soviets have nukes. Having Paulus or Grotewohl defect to the protestors simply sees them get shot.
 

Pangur

Donor
Let's say that Friedrich Paulus takes the protestors' side during the East German uprising of 1953 and organises a military coup against the SED. Could this maybe lead to more daring uprisings in the Eastern Block that makes it hard for the Soviets to put down the new regime? And if the Soviets backs off, could then the new regime maybe abandon Soviet-style Communism alltogether and instead either reunite with the West or becoming Nazi, Strasserist or Monarchist?
No way the Russians back off, a coup in East Germany lead by thevnazi General of Stalingrad eight years after the end of WW2? They would have gone frankly ape shit.
 
This is an interesting idea!
How much would and could GDR policies really change, though? Maybe a few churches don't get demolished, maybe the RIAS Trials don't end with death penalties - but on the whole, it would still be very recognisably the dictatorship we know, wouldn't it?
The two most glaring changes would be in the Stasi and the courts. Under Ulbricht and his attack dogs Erich Mielke and Hilde Benjamin both were transformed into something harsher than before:

The MfS under Zaisser and his short-term successor was pretty much a bog-standard secret police: Surveillance of regime opponents, (counter-)espionage, suppression of unrest, arrests for crimes against the people. Generally the victims were then sent to court. The justice system, where opponents were convicted of crimes based on repressive laws and often with forged proof or forced confessions. But again the courts still functioned procedurally like proper courts.

Both of those changed under Mielke/Benjamin. Mielke's Stasi saw repression of opponents in the society as insufficient and ultimately wanted to shape society. This started small with developing the doctrine of Politisch-ideologischer Diversion: The idea that external influences were the primary source of dissent and open repression only adresses the obvious symptoms. From that an increasing turn towards psychological warfare in dealing with dissidents was developed, as well as a need for extensive information about any possible recipient or source of external influences. Other Warsaw pact states to some degree also bought into theories like PiD and strategies like Zersetzung, but never to the same extent. In fact a recurring point of tension between WP security services was that the MfS was seen as too demanding, while the MfS viewed e.g. the Poles as too soft.

Benjamin did a similar reconstruction of the court system. Although to be fair the first steps were done before 1953, when she was only vice president of the Supreme Court (but her decisions there shaped the new legal doctrine): instead of statutory interpretation of the written law (however flawed the process was) its ideological meaning was to be the base of any court decision. And law studies, especially criminal law, were shaped that way: ideological certitude > knowledge of the law > ability to interpret it.

Zaisser, from what we can see today, argued largely for easing some of the restriction and pressure in a classic repressive system and making it more predictable and palatable. Grotewohl otl even after 1953 argued for maintaining rule of law and civil rights as well as more open debates, while still being in support of the SED-controlled GDR. Of them Zaisser seems to be the one more likely to succeed. Grotewohl would likely face a lot of opposition from the party and ultimately Moscow, even if otl they shielded him from SED retribution for his criticism, while the balance between maintaining control and liberal ideals in his ideas seems very unstable.

Either way one further element established by anpower transfer would be a pattern of relatively short terms of supreme control: Grotewohl otl became too ill to work by 1960, Zaisser died in 58 and his closest ally Herrnstad died in 1966.
 
Those are interesting points... more questions from me, because this intrigues me:
The two most glaring changes would be in the Stasi and the courts. Under Ulbricht and his attack dogs Erich Mielke and Hilde Benjamin both were transformed into something harsher than before:

The MfS under Zaisser and his short-term successor was pretty much a bog-standard secret police: Surveillance of regime opponents, (counter-)espionage, suppression of unrest, arrests for crimes against the people. Generally the victims were then sent to court. The justice system, where opponents were convicted of crimes based on repressive laws and often with forged proof or forced confessions. But again the courts still functioned procedurally like proper courts.

Both of those changed under Mielke/Benjamin. Mielke's Stasi saw repression of opponents in the society as insufficient and ultimately wanted to shape society. This started small with developing the doctrine of Politisch-ideologischer Diversion: The idea that external influences were the primary source of dissent and open repression only adresses the obvious symptoms. From that an increasing turn towards psychological warfare in dealing with dissidents was developed, as well as a need for extensive information about any possible recipient or source of external influences. Other Warsaw pact states to some degree also bought into theories like PiD and strategies like Zersetzung, but never to the same extent. In fact a recurring point of tension between WP security services was that the MfS was seen as too demanding, while the MfS viewed e.g. the Poles as too soft.
I suppose, then, that the Romanian Securitate must be counted among the most avid adopters of this same doctrine as the MfS?
(Would a less psychological-warfare-inclined Stasi also butterfly the psychological warfare of the Securitate?
As for Albania, I suppose there is no way to stop the Sigurimi from doing just that, Hoxha was too transformation-bound and paranoid and isolationist anyway...)

But, with a less ambitious Stasi, wouldn't the DDR see a lot more unrest? After all, it was the one Eastern Bloc state most difficult to shield off from Western influences, and Poland is a good example indeed of comparative instability for an Eastern Bloc regime. Could the DDR afford such "laxness"?

Either way one further element established by anpower transfer would be a pattern of relatively short terms of supreme control: Grotewohl otl became too ill to work by 1960, Zaisser died in 58 and his closest ally Herrnstad died in 1966.
If Ulbricht is sidelined in 1953, who could succeed them? And where would that take the GDR in the climate of the Chrushchev years?

Another question that just crossed my mind was Ulbricht's particular dislike of "Western" popular / youth culture. Would his absence mean more (and more unobstructed) GDR jazz, rock'n'roll and beat?
 
Those are interesting points... more questions from me, because this intrigues me:

I suppose, then, that the Romanian Securitate must be counted among the most avid adopters of this same doctrine as the MfS?
(Would a less psychological-warfare-inclined Stasi also butterfly the psychological warfare of the Securitate?
As for Albania, I suppose there is no way to stop the Sigurimi from doing just that, Hoxha was too transformation-bound and paranoid and isolationist anyway...)
I don't know all that much about other Eastern bloc security services. I remember an article on Stasi opinion about their allied services and vice versa: Basically the Stasi was not very popular, too demanding and a bit extreme for the rest, but also innovative and a trendsetter for new ideas. For them the Polish were the (not-so-)secretly Catholic wimps, the Czech reliable, but of limited competence, the Bulgarians friendly and competent, the Hungarians still mooning for Austria and the KGB far too willing to push the Stasi into risky situations where the Stasi gets the shit and the Russians the credit. About the only thing all of the services apparently agreed on was that no one liked the Securitate.
But, with a less ambitious Stasi, wouldn't the DDR see a lot more unrest? After all, it was the one Eastern Bloc state most difficult to shield off from Western influences, and Poland is a good example indeed of comparative instability for an Eastern Bloc regime. Could the DDR afford such "laxness"?
Depends on what replaces the Stasi system. Ultimately that too failed, maybe another approach is actually better at funneling or suppressing discontent. The Stasi will have to deal with the FRG as rival system in some way. Or maybe the fall of Ulbricht only delays the establishment of total control by a few years and whoever replaces his successor still implements something similar.
If Ulbricht is sidelined in 1953, who could succeed them? And where would that take the GDR in the climate of the Chrushchev years?
Depends on the exact events. Unless Beria wins in Moscow and outright imposes Zaisser on the GDR, my guess is that overall it will be a more a collective than one leader. The obvious front runners Zaisser and Grotewohl have both weaknesses that would make them unpalatable for the rest of the party leadership and/or Moscow if left unchecked: namely one is a chekist with connections to the old regime in Moscow, the other is a Social Democrat and a party outsider. Herrnstadt appears as a somewhat equal partner to Zaisser in the bid to oust Ulbricht, but he is really only a journalist (though a Jewish ruler of a German state less than a decade after WW2 would be interesting). And other Central Committee members who supported Zaisser otl followed his lead, so even if they are pushed into the pole position, they would get there only through support and with help from other power centers. So most likely the winner would be a primus inter pares.
Another question that just crossed my mind was Ulbricht's particular dislike of "Western" popular / youth culture. Would his absence mean more (and more unobstructed) GDR jazz, rock'n'roll and beat?
No idea. It is still a western youth movement and whatever else the GDR will be a repressive Warsaw Pact state with ideals of a disciplined youth.
 
But, with a less ambitious Stasi, wouldn't the DDR see a lot more unrest? After all, it was the one Eastern Bloc state most difficult to shield off from Western influences, and Poland is a good example indeed of comparative instability for an Eastern Bloc regime. Could the DDR afford such "laxness"?
Interestingly enough, while the idea that proximity to the West facilitated unrest in the Eastern Bloc seems like common sense it is far from proven. Solidarność arose in Poland, which was physically further from "the West" than the ČSSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, technically even the transcaucasian SSRs. One widely-cited political sciences paper, Opium for the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilize Authoritarian Regimes, even claims that the "Valley of the Clueless" – the 15% of the DDR populace who lived outside of West German VHF transmitters' reach, mostly in the upper Elbe valley – was measurably less satisfied with the regime than the well-informed 85%.
 
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