Not to be daunted...if there is no Battle of Midway?

[steel_captain]

It's mid 1942 and the entire Kido Butai is intact and operational. On the US side sitting in Pearl Harbor are the ENTERPRISE, YORKTOWN, HORNET, & SARATOGA. Does the USN bring the WASP to the Pacific under these circumstances?

Since the reason the USN felt it could start the Guadalcanal offensive in August was because of its big Midway victory, can we assume it does not go there now? That means no Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz and none of the bloody surface battles.

Does Japan implement their Operation FS and seize New Caledonia, Fiji and the Samoas ? If so, how does the US react? If Magic tells us that is where the next shoe will drop, does FS force a replacement Battle of Midway south of the equator?

If for whatever reason there is no Operation FS does Nimitz keep the US carriers at PH (excepting occasional raids) in order to build strength with the soon to arrive ESSEXs or does he start his Central Pacific Drive with the carriers he has even though he would face the larger KB? Is Nimitz at all impatient or susceptible to pressure to get on with it even if he believes waiting to have more carriers as well as all other support ships is a best course? Do Roosevelt and King both give him a free hand to choose himself?

Also without a Midway or an Operation FS, what does Yamamoto do with the KB during the period after Coral Sea until early 1943? Does he come up with another hairbrained plan to lure Nimitz into a trap?

 

[Catspoke]

USA has 4 carriers so will defend New Caledonia and the sea route to Australia as before, 4 plus land based air plus radar, matches 6 Japanese carriers. USA hoping for favorable attrition if the opportunity presents itself.

 

[CV12Hornet]

It's mid 1942 and the entire Kido Butai is intact and operational. On the US side sitting in Pearl Harbor are the ENTERPRISE, YORKTOWN, HORNET, & SARATOGA. Does the USN bring the WASP to the Pacific under these circumstances?

Yes. Wasp was dispatched to the Pacific in May 1942, after Coral Sea but before Midway. I suspect the USN expected Yorktown to take longer to repair, and in fairness in this situation I'd expect the USN to take the opportunity to repair her fully.

Since the reason the USN felt it could start the Guadalcanal offensive in August was because of its big Midway victory, can we assume it does not go there now? That means no Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz and none of the bloody surface battles.

Most likely not, correct. Guadalcanal was a result of the crushing victory at Midway and American thinking as to how to exploit it.

Does Japan implement their Operation MS and seize New Caledonia, Fiji and the Samoas ? If so, how does the US react? If Magic tells us that is where the next shoe will drop, does MS force a replacement Battle of Midway south of the equator?

If for whatever reason there is no Operation MS does Nimitz keep the US carriers at PH (excepting occasional raids) in order to build strength with the soon to arrive ESSEXs or does he start his Central Pacific Drive with the carriers he has even though he would face the larger KB? Is Nimitz at all impatient or susceptible to pressure to get on with it even if he believes waiting to have more carriers as well as all other support ships is a best course? Do Roosevelt and King both give him a free hand to choose himself?

Also without a Midway or an Operation MS, what does Yamamoto do with the KB during the period after Coral Sea until early 1943? Does he come up with another hairbrained plan to lure Nimitz into a trap?

FS, but yes. The Japanese had no concept of knowing where to stop, and the operation presents the Americans an opportunity to hit the Japanese carriers while strung out on a long logistical tether, surrounded by land-based air, and busy trying to suppress that land-based air. Perfect for some carrier shenanigans.

In the event of no FS Nimitz isn't going anywhere near the Central Pacific on anything more than raids, and Washington will let him. The USN was very clear about how it planned to go about its Central Pacific offensive throughout the interwar period, giving them a suitable rhetorical cudgel to present to the politicos in DC.

Okay, let's assume no FS. First, the Japanese are almost certainly going to take an operational pause to overhaul ships, rebuild air groups, and in general rest a force that had spent half a year running around fighting fires. The most likely next move? The Aleutians, first an offensive and then defending once it becomes clear how miserable the islands are for supporting an advance anywhere of consequence.

 

[steel_captain]

And if Japan launches it FS Operation? Assuming Magic tips us off to it ahead of time, does Nimitz try to interdict the IJN? It is also a long way from home for the Americans and our logistical tether would be pretty stretched as well.

 

[Somedevil]

And if Japan launches it FS Operation? Assuming Magic tips us off to it ahead of time, does Nimitz try to interdict the IJN? It is also a long way from home for the Americans and our logistical tether would be pretty stretched as well.

yes I 100% believes he does the Interesting thing the Brits and Aussies might add some ships what they could add I really don't know

 

[CV12Hornet]

And if Japan launches it FS Operation? Assuming Magic tips us off to it ahead of time, does Nimitz try to interdict the IJN? It is also a long way from home for the Americans and our logistical tether would be pretty stretched as well.

Yes, but the US has the advantage in nearby basing in Samoa and Fiji and other such locations. So yes, they would, probably while the Japanese are busy trying to take New Caledonia.

 

[nbcman]

With regards to a mid-1942 Operation FS, this post has a great summary of the US ground forces stationed in the Pacific to include the locations where the IJN would be attempting to invade.

Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

The Japanese would need some mighty big Alien Space Mammals to pull this one off. Hence the term 'dream invasion'.

www.alternatehistory.com

 

[steel_captain]

So since the WASP is coming I would assume Nimitz waits for it to arrive to give him a 5 on 6 regarding fleet carriers but the IJN also has their two CVLs and both of the slow HIYO pair to bring to that party meaning actually 5 on 10 flight decks. Those become some pretty long odds for the USN to face?

Regarding BBs, YAMATO is available in this scenario as do the two NORTH CAROLINAs and the SOUTH DAKOTA. If we leave out the four KONGOs and other old IJN BBs but leave in the two NAGATOs gives Yamamoto three IJN BBs vs. three USN BBs just in case somehow a BB slugfest happens minus carrier involvement. However if this new TL is July(ish) none of the US BBs has made it to join the Pacific Fleet making it no US BBs on the field. How does Nimitz deal with that?

To summarize this scenario, if Japan launches FS in June or July Nimitz will be going into any attempts to challenge the IJN at a big numerical disadvantage in ships even with having Magic Intelligence. Figure both sides are going to be short of fleet train support but IJN has numerical superiority with all classes of surface warships and we know from Guadalcanal the IJN would be at a big advantage if Nimitz cannot ensure any surface actions to be daylight only.

So how do these dominoes fall for each side? Could this lead to that great Kantai Kessen Yamamoto dreams of? Knowing he is at a big numerical disadvantage still does Nimitz only challenge the IJN in a much more limited way as to not take a big risk? Allow the loss of New Caledonia and New Hebrides but try to retain Fiji and the Samoas?

 

[DougM]

The US will counter any know advances that Japan makes, and because of the better code breaking the US will odds on have better positions and better knowledge of any battle in that time frame, much as they did at Midway. There was nothing sacred about Midway. Yes the US got lucky in some ways (and unlucky in others) but the superior knowledge was the single biggest advantage the US had.
And frankly to many people see Japan in 41-mid42 as untouchable but in reality they had two things going for them.. momentum as after PH and the other late 41 defeats the US and it’s Allie’s where recalling on there back feet. But by mid 42 the US was starting to get its balance back and catch up. So you have a very good chance of a battle elsewhere coming close to doing a “Midway” on Japan.
That being said the US was very much playing a holding game in 42 as they knew full well that starting in late 42 and running through 43 they had a huge number of ships coming and once those ships started to arrive Japan was doomed.
So the US didn’t NEED to go on the offensive. They only did because Midway gave them the chance to.
So you won’t see a lot of huge risks being taken but they will try and take advantage of the situation like they did at Midway.

 

[Cymraeg]

It's mid 1942 and the entire Kido Butai is intact and operational. On the US side sitting in Pearl Harbor are the ENTERPRISE, YORKTOWN, HORNET, & SARATOGA. Does the USN bring the WASP to the Pacific under these circumstances?

Since the reason the USN felt it could start the Guadalcanal offensive in August was because of its big Midway victory, can we assume it does not go there now? That means no Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz and none of the bloody surface battles.

Does Japan implement their Operation FS and seize New Caledonia, Fiji and the Samoas ? If so, how does the US react? If Magic tells us that is where the next shoe will drop, does FS force a replacement Battle of Midway south of the equator?

If for whatever reason there is no Operation FS does Nimitz keep the US carriers at PH (excepting occasional raids) in order to build strength with the soon to arrive ESSEXs or does he start his Central Pacific Drive with the carriers he has even though he would face the larger KB? Is Nimitz at all impatient or susceptible to pressure to get on with it even if he believes waiting to have more carriers as well as all other support ships is a best course? Do Roosevelt and King both give him a free hand to choose himself?

Also without a Midway or an Operation FS, what does Yamamoto do with the KB during the period after Coral Sea until early 1943? Does he come up with another hairbrained plan to lure Nimitz into a trap?

What would be the point of departure? No Dolittle raid? Yamamoto was pressing hard for the Midway operation, I'm just wondering why he'd junk it suddenly before Coral Sea?
The IJN was fixated on its great decisive battle obsession (do not get me started, I will rant on that) so is FS an attempt at making this happen?
And let me get this straight, does Coral Sea still happen, in which case Lexington is still sunk, Yorktown damaged, Shōkaku damaged and Zuikaku's air wing savaged (removing both Japanese carriers from the board due to utterly inflexible Japanese airwing practices)?

 

[steel_captain]

What would be the point of departure? No Dolittle raid?

The point of departure is the day MI was greenlighted. Yes, the Doolittle Raid has happened OTL as well as Coral Sea. It is just the Yamamoto gets turned down by the Naval Staff with his resignation or not...(he might have been simply bluffing) and FS becomes the stated priority to expand the outer defense perimeter and cut off US communications with the land of Oz.

 

[CV12Hornet]

So how do these dominoes fall for each side? Could this lead to that great Kantai Kessen Yamamoto dreams of? Knowing he is at a big numerical disadvantage still dies Nimitz only challenge the IJN in a much more limited way as to not take a big risk? Allow the loss of New Caledonia and New Hebrides but try to retain Fiji and the Samoas?

IMO, the same sort of strategy at Midway: seek battle of conditions are favorable, but no big risks to the ships.

So since the WASP is coming I would assume Nimitz waits for it to arrive to give him a 5 on 6 regarding fleet carriers but the IJN also has their two CVLs and both of the slow HIYO pair to bring to that party meaning actually 5 on 10 flight decks. Those become some pretty long odds for the USN to face?

The US was willing to accept those odds at Santa Cruz and carrier combat is a rocket tag game, if they can catch the Japanese off guard they can do horrendous damage even while outnumbered.

Plus, knowing the Japanese they’re going to scatter their light carriers hither and yon and leave themselves open to defeat in detail.

Regarding BBs YAMATO becomes available now in this scenario as do the two NORTH CAROLINAs and the SOUTH DAKOTA. If we leave out the four KONGOs and other old IJN BBs but leave in the two NAGATOs gives Yamamoto three IJN BBs vs. three USN BBs just in case somehow a BB slugfest happens minus carrier involvement. However if this new TL is July(ish) none of the US BBs has made it to join the Pacific Fleet making it no US BBs on the field. How does Nimitz deal with that?

Likely he commits some of the Standards to Fiji or thereabouts, as was actually done during the Guadalcanal campaign. Close enough to act as a fallback, but not slowing down the carriers.

A couple of side notes: one, Japan doesn’t get Shokaku back until mid-July. Two, they may very well still launch AL in June, causing a significant diversion of strength.

 

[steel_captain]

I note that I have mistakenly left out those of the Standards which were still available so even without any of the new BBs yet to arrive, Nimitz does have some force to counter the old IJN BBs in this scenario. YAMATO is of course another story

Regarding Operation AL, I guess we leave that per OTL, but would Nimitz ever really care about the Aleutians as far as his available assets were concerned? It was such a backwater which could never be used by Japan strategically.

Question: by June '42, which of the Standards were in the Pacific and combat capable?

 

[nbcman]

I note that I have mistakenly left out those of the Standards which were still available so even without any of the new BBs yet to arrive, Nimitz does have some force to counter the old IJN BBs in this scenario. YAMATO is of course another story

Regarding Operation AL, I guess we leave that per OTL, but would Nimitz ever really care about the Aleutians as far as his available assets were concerned? It was such a backwater which could never be used by Japan strategically.

Question: in June '42, which of the Standards in the Pacific were combat capable?

That would be Task Force 1 / West Coast Patrol Force that was steaming off the US west coast which consisted of the following BBs New Mexico, Idaho, Mississippi, Tennessee (from 42/05), Maryland(from 42/06), Colorado (from 42/06), Pennsylvania (from 42/06). Source: http://pacific.valka.cz/forces/tf1.htm#midway

There was insufficient fuel available at PH to support the 3 carriers + Saratoga plus the 7 fuel hog BBs. So the BBs stayed along the US west coast where there was virtually unlimited fuel for them to operate / train.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Regarding Operation AL, I guess we leave that per OTL, but would Nimitz ever really care about the Aleutians as far as his available assets were concerned? It was such a backwater which could never be used by Japan strategically.

OTL Nimitz sent a cruiser-destroyer force to keep the Japanese honest. Here, even with extra carriers to screen he should be able to do so again.

 

[steel_captain]

There was insufficient fuel available at PH to support the 3 carriers + Saratoga plus the 7 fuel hog BBs. So the BBs stayed along the US west coast where there was virtually unlimited fuel for them to operate / train

It has always surprised me that with so many ships that burned so much fuel oil that the USN did not build themselves a much larger fleet of oilers before the war! When war finally came, they realized all of a sudden that they did not have any way to feed those fat battle wagons so that they could actually use them where the fighting was and it wasn't until the Navy was able to add enough fleet oilers to the logistics train that they could be able to bring those ships from the west coast to the Central Pacific

 

[CV12Hornet]

It has always surprised me that with so many ships that burned so much fuel oil that the USN did not build themselves a much larger fleet of oilers before the war! When war finally came, they realized all of a sudden that they did not have any way to feed those fat battle wagons so that they could actually use them where the fighting was and it wasn't until the Navy was able to add enough fleet oilers to the logistics train that they could be able to bring those ships from the west coast to the Central Pacific

No, they knew the entire interwar period. They figured that they could build oilers quickly and that they were better off investing limited peacetime budget on proper warships.

 

[steel_captain]

No, they knew the entire interwar period. They figured that they could build oilers quickly and that they were better off investing limited peacetime budget on proper warships.

better make that Vice Admiral Wile E. Coyote, USN

 

[Dorknought]

No, they knew the entire interwar period. They figured that they could build oilers quickly and that they were better off investing limited peacetime budget on proper warships.

Navy: We need lots of oilers.
Congress: Why?
Navy: So we can move the fleet across the other side of the Pacific to conduct a close blockade of Japan and starve them into submission.
Congress: ?

 

[Dorknought]

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better make that Vice Admiral Wile E. Coyote, USN

The Japanese navy had figured this out too which is why they subsidised merchant tanker construction so they could take it over in a war emergency just as they did in 1941 when all the tankers were idle anyway.