Like using every part of the Buffalo!
Finding these kinds of weirdos and making them not just prominent and but competent politicians is part of what makes this TL still interesting to write
Sequel de Mayo (Cinco de Mayo, Vol. II)
- Thread starter KingSweden24
- Start date
Humanity does tend to advance when you have some eccentric characters...some of the time.
All-time great mustache on this guy. He looks like a turn-of-the-century Andy Reid.
You are too good to me sometimes you know that?
While, I was re-reading the Cinco de Mayo (given that it is too long, I had to reread it, certainly my loss of interest in the timeline during its last hundred or so pages due to getting annoyed at alarms, does not help), I came across the Kurt and Karl Olson section. It got me thinking about whether we can think about what will happen to our ancestors in this scenario too, in a chapter sense, like what you did with your grandparents, getting inspired by their lives, given that we already talked about it in the discussions.
What do you, and others too, think about it?
What do you, and others too, think about it?
Perhaps. I'll admit I decided to ditch the Kurt and Karl section almost as soon as I wrote it, lol
Did you do it in reader mode, its easier if you want to skip the discussion and just read the story...
I am doing it in the reader mode now, and I am currently in the Archibald Bliss chapter, one after Mexican nationalists stumbling into a trade war.
(I think I read it previously, but I forgot when I last left it off)
.......ok. That's an odd thing to look for and suddenly point out.
lol.
A New Tsar in a New Century: The Life and Reign of Michael II of Russia
"...hopes for a Russian renewal had, unfortunately, not yet revealed themselves at the end of Michael's first decade on the throne, despite all his efforts or Stolypin's. While the 1920s are, rightfully, seen as a golden age of Russian economic development and modernization, the 1910s still did not see the type of transformation many businessmen inside and outside of the Empire had hoped for.
The Stolypin Reform had not made agriculture any more efficient; indeed, all it had done was irritate the traditional obschinskiy, the exact opposite of its intent. Five million persons had moved to Siberia in the previous decade, but that was far below the vision of men like Kokovtsov, who had dreamed of a Russian East that loomed in the public imagination the same way as the Wild West once had for Americans, whom St. Petersburg begrudgingly admired economically even if they were increasingly appalled by its progressivism politically, though many conservatives viewed it as a convenient "external exile" for Russia's Jews. Statistically, Russia was further less impressive; many parts of the Empire had fewer factories than there had been in 1880 and it had just under forty thousand kilometers of rail [1], a pittance for such a vast, sprawling country, which limited not only its ability to deploy the military to distant frontiers when needed but severely hampered the ability of goods both raw and agricultural to reach cities and, more importantly, ports for export. Compounding this issue was the atrocious condition on Russia's roads, which were the responsibility of local governorates and oblasts. Uneven, pockmarked with potholes and inconsistently connected, they were so bad that it was sometimes difficult to traverse them by horse and buggy, let alone automobile, leaving Russia well behind her European peers in the deployment of the most exciting new technology of the decade, the car. Similar stories existed for the atrocious Russian hospital system, especially in rural regions where country doctors practiced medicine in ways ten or twenty years out of date, and for Russian orphanages, prisons and asylums.
This all said, Michael was not incompetent, naive in some ways as he may have been, and genuine strides were made in Russia between 1908 and 1917, and not just on constitutional questions for which he is famed. The Russian school system flourished, becoming an obvious place of employment for many of those wandering off the reformed mir, and focuses on secondary and vocational education helped create a population that was primed for the boomtimes looming on the horizon, as well as dramatically improving literacy rates - particularly those for women - at a pace unseen anywhere else in the world, even Mexico which saw a similar drop in illiteracy at the same time. Russian tariffs helped engender a thriving light and, on the margins, heavy industrial base that while in many ways siloing many parts of the Russian economy off from European trade protected other parts of her economy from being overwhelmed by British, French or German finished goods, and the sectors of Russian industry that were geared towards European exports, such as the Swedish-financed oil concern Branobel, thrived.
As the 1910s started to draw towards a close and war clouds loomed on the European horizon, Russia was thus at peace and starting to take small steps towards improvement even if it was still furlongs behind her neighbors and peers, and financing for Russian industry started to slowly rise, especially from Germany, as its position as an attractive new frontier of growth and investment rather than a strange, reactionary land alien to Western European mores cemented itself amongst European financiers..." [2]
- A New Tsar in a New Century: The Life and Reign of Michael II of Russia
[1] About 10k less than OTL Russia as of 1917
[2] My loose shorthand has always been that Russia is about 12-15 years behind its OTL pace economically thanks to losing the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and not getting all that sweet, sweet French money in the 1890s and British funding starting post-1907. So in other words, Russia in 1917 is somewhere around where the OTL Tsarist Russia was in around 1902-05ish. That "time gap" will start to narrow a bit in the 1920s as its economy supplies Europe during the CEW and, of course, the destruction of WWI and the RCW don't gut Russia entirely.
The Stolypin Reform had not made agriculture any more efficient; indeed, all it had done was irritate the traditional obschinskiy, the exact opposite of its intent. Five million persons had moved to Siberia in the previous decade, but that was far below the vision of men like Kokovtsov, who had dreamed of a Russian East that loomed in the public imagination the same way as the Wild West once had for Americans, whom St. Petersburg begrudgingly admired economically even if they were increasingly appalled by its progressivism politically, though many conservatives viewed it as a convenient "external exile" for Russia's Jews. Statistically, Russia was further less impressive; many parts of the Empire had fewer factories than there had been in 1880 and it had just under forty thousand kilometers of rail [1], a pittance for such a vast, sprawling country, which limited not only its ability to deploy the military to distant frontiers when needed but severely hampered the ability of goods both raw and agricultural to reach cities and, more importantly, ports for export. Compounding this issue was the atrocious condition on Russia's roads, which were the responsibility of local governorates and oblasts. Uneven, pockmarked with potholes and inconsistently connected, they were so bad that it was sometimes difficult to traverse them by horse and buggy, let alone automobile, leaving Russia well behind her European peers in the deployment of the most exciting new technology of the decade, the car. Similar stories existed for the atrocious Russian hospital system, especially in rural regions where country doctors practiced medicine in ways ten or twenty years out of date, and for Russian orphanages, prisons and asylums.
This all said, Michael was not incompetent, naive in some ways as he may have been, and genuine strides were made in Russia between 1908 and 1917, and not just on constitutional questions for which he is famed. The Russian school system flourished, becoming an obvious place of employment for many of those wandering off the reformed mir, and focuses on secondary and vocational education helped create a population that was primed for the boomtimes looming on the horizon, as well as dramatically improving literacy rates - particularly those for women - at a pace unseen anywhere else in the world, even Mexico which saw a similar drop in illiteracy at the same time. Russian tariffs helped engender a thriving light and, on the margins, heavy industrial base that while in many ways siloing many parts of the Russian economy off from European trade protected other parts of her economy from being overwhelmed by British, French or German finished goods, and the sectors of Russian industry that were geared towards European exports, such as the Swedish-financed oil concern Branobel, thrived.
As the 1910s started to draw towards a close and war clouds loomed on the European horizon, Russia was thus at peace and starting to take small steps towards improvement even if it was still furlongs behind her neighbors and peers, and financing for Russian industry started to slowly rise, especially from Germany, as its position as an attractive new frontier of growth and investment rather than a strange, reactionary land alien to Western European mores cemented itself amongst European financiers..." [2]
- A New Tsar in a New Century: The Life and Reign of Michael II of Russia
[1] About 10k less than OTL Russia as of 1917
[2] My loose shorthand has always been that Russia is about 12-15 years behind its OTL pace economically thanks to losing the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and not getting all that sweet, sweet French money in the 1890s and British funding starting post-1907. So in other words, Russia in 1917 is somewhere around where the OTL Tsarist Russia was in around 1902-05ish. That "time gap" will start to narrow a bit in the 1920s as its economy supplies Europe during the CEW and, of course, the destruction of WWI and the RCW don't gut Russia entirely.
Does this mean that once the CEW ends, Russian goods will be ahead of its European peers? Will Russia, in a twist of fate, be a financial hub?
No no, just that CEW is a boon for Russia and helps narrow the gap substantively
I wonder how much American capital will run to Russia seeking higher returns on investments.
On this era, little or none, we were still a destination for outbound investment and a pretty large net debtor until WWI forced Britain to liquidate substantial American investments to buy war materiel.
That will happen over time ITTL but might take into the 30’s, and if the Democrats in the late 20’s preside over the sort of broad-based, demand-driven boom that occurred IOTL’s 1940’s-60’s, it’ll slow the process until lower-risk domestic investment opportunities are drawn down.
This, essentially. Bear in mind, too, that the GAW probably increased America’s net debtor load quite a bit, so it’s not likely your shift to being a net creditor until maybe the early 1940s or so.
Hard to say how much debt we’d take on on international markets. American fiscal capacity in this era is likely better than French, German, or Italian and probably better even than British, and the US also has a larger population with more money than those nations, so domestic war bond sales will be more important. And while I’m sure we need some Stirling to buy things, it doesn’t seem to be as important a source of war materiel as the other direction was IOTL.
Better? Sure but hardly enough to sustain something like the GAW included reconstruction, return to peacetime economy and the pension of the soldiers; modern warfare make you rich only if you have an ocean of distance between you and the fight, arrive late and you are also the main supplier of everyone else.
Not considering that paying back the bonds plus interest will be a severe strain for the american treasury as it was for everyone else post WWI in the delicate and periolious moment of passage from wat to peace time economy, so if they have not started to borrow before they will do now