Sequel de Mayo (Cinco de Mayo, Vol. II)
- Thread starter KingSweden24
- Start date
Speaking of Brazil, An update on Uruguay would be nice. Are they still under Brazilian Occupation or the Blancos establish a government there?
Weimar Germany vibes right here:
Left and Right wing paramilitary violence (Check)
Unstable Governments (Also check)
I wonder if the military just says enough is enough and launch a coup and overthrow their weak monarch that is afraid of them anyway.
Really well put - not much to add to these thoughts, other than that France's isolation is only worsening, and hopefully my efforts in charting out why France feels so paranoid make sense without resorting to making them cartoonish
But you see, it is harder for me to read, so
Ayup. Entryism is a time-tested thing for a reason
...no. Getulio Vargas.
We’ll have something coming up but I’d have to consult my notes on exactly when
Yeah, postwar Brazil here is a mix of Italy/Weimar Germany. Of course, Plinio Salgado is no Mussolini, and he’s definitely no Hitler - but he’ll have some fairly wacky ideas to introduce nonetheless. (Integralism lacks the weird futurist/positivist aspect of fascism after all)
Could it be that the reason why American soft imperialism in Central America ended in ‘69 because someone successfully revived the idea of a unified Central America? A unified Central America would be an amusing contrast to the somewhat Balkanized Canada.
True, Integralism after all is just taking the phrase "Christ is King" to the literal fullest potential it can be. It's lacks ambition other than that.
When you think about it, Syndicalism and Integralism both suffer from a lack of ambition. Unlike the former, Syndicalism is "Workers own the means of production" and nothing more
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I like your thinking though those who’ve predicted a more… shall we say tropical Suez are barking up the right tree
That’s true and, in terms of my thinking in planning this out, partly by design
Second Wave: The Postwar Progressive Revolution of 1917-31
"...few men had mainstreamed the idea of Georgist taxation more than Tom L. Johnson, William Randolph Hearst's ill-fated but well-liked Vice President. Johnson had tried and failed to pass such a tax in Cleveland during his mayoralty, but he had never ceased believing in the single land tax, and a number of his acolytes had since managed to pass such laws in Toledo, Dayton, and Athens after his death. One of his chief proteges, Newton D. Baker, was now a powerful Senate Democrat tapped to one day be a Senate leader or even a President; though Ohio's Governor James M. Cox was not a Johnsonite, he got on well with that faction of the party and when a bill arose to limit the ability of municipalities to levy a land tax, Cox was instrumental in helping defeat it even if he was skeptical of extending the land tax to the entirety of the state.
The late 1910s and early 1920s thus saw a blooming of the use of Georgist taxation as an "alternative revenue" vehicle. It was appealing specifically because it was so simple - it taxed, and in a way penalized, unproductive and inefficient urban land, and even many Liberals had a hard time sympathizing with large landowners who "provided little public good." Seattle had passed a two-percent land levy in 1913 under Hulet Wells, a Socialist, but raised that levy higher to three-and-a-half in late 1917 under a much more conservative administration, proving its relative lack of controversy there at that point. While the heartland of the Georgist tax was New York or Ohio (by virtue of George and Johnson having been mayors of New York and Cleveland), it was quickly spreading across America as a new plank in the efficiency revolution of the postwar years. The sharp decline in industrial production had badly hollowed out municipal budgets that had become reliant upon sales and excise taxes and, in some cases, employee head taxes; the land tax was an easy way to plug that gap and very straightforward to assess, what with city and county assessor's offices knowing where municipal boundaries ended and keeping excellent records of various plats and properties.
Indeed, what revealed Georgism's mainstreaming more than anything was that it was often Liberal candidates who endorsed it as a revenue-raiser - in order to avoid income taxes at the state and municipal level, as there were still a great many in that party who were skeptical if not hostile to an income tax, period (although such hostility was often much more muted in state rather than federal government). A land tax was an easy workaround that allowed delays in generally more unpopular taxes on income, a workaround that Democrats found themselves happy to use as well and avoid potentially unpopular votes as people looked to stretch their meagre wages further than they had prewar.
As such, 1917 and 1918 were banner years for the land tax. Spokane passed a land-value tax of eight percent, the highest in the country; cities as varied geographically and politically as San Diego, Scranton, Hartford, and even Philadelphia followed suit. But the true triumph came in the spring of 1918, when the state of Oregon passed a land-value tax that would encompass the entire state, exempting "agricultural uses beyond municipal boundaries" from properties affected but otherwise extending one single rate from the Pacific to the Snake River in what was generally considered the most conservative polity on the West Coast. Georgism was no longer a fringe project of the left but rather a mainstream revenue-raiser embraced by the center and the right; Georgist taxation, in other words, was here to stay..."
- Second Wave: The Postwar Progressive Revolution of 1917-31
The late 1910s and early 1920s thus saw a blooming of the use of Georgist taxation as an "alternative revenue" vehicle. It was appealing specifically because it was so simple - it taxed, and in a way penalized, unproductive and inefficient urban land, and even many Liberals had a hard time sympathizing with large landowners who "provided little public good." Seattle had passed a two-percent land levy in 1913 under Hulet Wells, a Socialist, but raised that levy higher to three-and-a-half in late 1917 under a much more conservative administration, proving its relative lack of controversy there at that point. While the heartland of the Georgist tax was New York or Ohio (by virtue of George and Johnson having been mayors of New York and Cleveland), it was quickly spreading across America as a new plank in the efficiency revolution of the postwar years. The sharp decline in industrial production had badly hollowed out municipal budgets that had become reliant upon sales and excise taxes and, in some cases, employee head taxes; the land tax was an easy way to plug that gap and very straightforward to assess, what with city and county assessor's offices knowing where municipal boundaries ended and keeping excellent records of various plats and properties.
Indeed, what revealed Georgism's mainstreaming more than anything was that it was often Liberal candidates who endorsed it as a revenue-raiser - in order to avoid income taxes at the state and municipal level, as there were still a great many in that party who were skeptical if not hostile to an income tax, period (although such hostility was often much more muted in state rather than federal government). A land tax was an easy workaround that allowed delays in generally more unpopular taxes on income, a workaround that Democrats found themselves happy to use as well and avoid potentially unpopular votes as people looked to stretch their meagre wages further than they had prewar.
As such, 1917 and 1918 were banner years for the land tax. Spokane passed a land-value tax of eight percent, the highest in the country; cities as varied geographically and politically as San Diego, Scranton, Hartford, and even Philadelphia followed suit. But the true triumph came in the spring of 1918, when the state of Oregon passed a land-value tax that would encompass the entire state, exempting "agricultural uses beyond municipal boundaries" from properties affected but otherwise extending one single rate from the Pacific to the Snake River in what was generally considered the most conservative polity on the West Coast. Georgism was no longer a fringe project of the left but rather a mainstream revenue-raiser embraced by the center and the right; Georgist taxation, in other words, was here to stay..."
- Second Wave: The Postwar Progressive Revolution of 1917-31
The Central European War
"...looking back on the period 1916-18 as something of a prewar "golden age," the last breaths of the Belle Epoque, perhaps through rose-colored glasses. Nonetheless, there is some truth to the halcyon sentiments around that time. The optimism of the late 1910s was in sharp contrast to the more muted and unstable decade to come, particularly in terms of people's views of technological innovation. For an average person of that time, their life - typically born in the 1880s - had seen the remarkable revolution of not just mass electricity but now automotive transportation, urbanization, and the marvel of human flight. European culture and civilization had reached its zenith, controlling or influencing every corner of the globe; middle-class Europeans were, for the first time, increasingly able to access goods from around the globe, especially foodstuffs, and were finding their way into more secure work for better wages, and a broad, rising standard of living.
While its hard to separate the soft glow of this time from the carnage of the Central European War and economic volatility of the 1920s thereafter, there is nonetheless no doubt that on the eve of the crises that sparked the conflagration, Europe was undergoing a broad, though unevenly felt, economic boom that had kicked off with war orders flowing to the United States and other belligerents in the Great American War and then matured into a broader, consumer-goods cyclical bull market that was particularly strong in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Cisleithnian Austria. France, to be sure, was growing at a fast clip, but still not at the rates of its glorious 1880s or even the first decade of the 20th century; this in part was pivotal to the general French sense of malaise and falling behind their continental peers even if, in reality, it was more an effect of their neighbors starting to catch up. Poverty in Europe declined by over ten percent between 1911-18, and the number of owners of automobiles quadrupled. There was a sense of stability across Europe that had not been there as recently as the upheavals of 1912, and a feeling of joy and peace that would never have betrayed the bloodshed to come. But it was not just in comparison of what came after; the economic revolution of the 1910s was very much real, and sunny memories of that time were not merely nostalgia..."
- The Central European War
While its hard to separate the soft glow of this time from the carnage of the Central European War and economic volatility of the 1920s thereafter, there is nonetheless no doubt that on the eve of the crises that sparked the conflagration, Europe was undergoing a broad, though unevenly felt, economic boom that had kicked off with war orders flowing to the United States and other belligerents in the Great American War and then matured into a broader, consumer-goods cyclical bull market that was particularly strong in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Cisleithnian Austria. France, to be sure, was growing at a fast clip, but still not at the rates of its glorious 1880s or even the first decade of the 20th century; this in part was pivotal to the general French sense of malaise and falling behind their continental peers even if, in reality, it was more an effect of their neighbors starting to catch up. Poverty in Europe declined by over ten percent between 1911-18, and the number of owners of automobiles quadrupled. There was a sense of stability across Europe that had not been there as recently as the upheavals of 1912, and a feeling of joy and peace that would never have betrayed the bloodshed to come. But it was not just in comparison of what came after; the economic revolution of the 1910s was very much real, and sunny memories of that time were not merely nostalgia..."
- The Central European War
@KingSweden24
[SQUEEING] LAND VALUE TAX!!!!
Well that explains some of the lack of sprawl in the US as housing improvement is mechanistically incentivized in large urban centers.
[SQUEEING] LAND VALUE TAX!!!!
Well that explains some of the lack of sprawl in the US as housing improvement is mechanistically incentivized in large urban centers.
It’s me putting my thumb on the scale a bit but, hey, even this TL needs some utopian concepts
Don't know anything about Georgism or LVTs one way or the other but I am interested in seeing how all this plays out in the short and long terms.
About 5, give or take depending on how I want to structure certain ones
I wonder when we will get the next Ottoman update.
I feel like it will come during the July of 1918 of this timeline, as it was the month Mehmed V (the Ottoman Sultan in both timelines who preferred poetry and religious studies over political stuff) died.
We’ll have one before that focusing on the beginning of the end of Sabahaddin’s Ahrar Party dominance, and then the Mehmed update will be later
(Bear in mind Yusuf Izzeddin (spelling? You know who I mean) hasn’t “died in his sleep” ITTL, so he’s the successor)