What do you think the Confederacy did wrong?

It's clear you don't understand what you just read. Unarmored, but subdivided means solid shot will blow holes though the hull, and cause fire, or flooding. Ships steering can be destroyed. Have you ever read an account of an ironclad battle? They didn't just sail though unscathed. Read what happened to the CSS Tennessee at Mobile Bay. Warrior never entered combat, within a few years the British realized this was a gross design fault, and corrected it with later designs.

A lot of Trent Warriors see their favorite side's ironclads as invincible, but they were actually all experimental and all had flaws. In addition to the problems you mention, HMS Warrior had a deep draft and was very unmanueverable. It was a deep water ship intended to patrol a worldwide empire, but in shallow coastal waters or riverine waters it would have been at a significant disadvantage.

Union ironclads were designed for coastal and riverine waters - in the open ocean their shallow draft would have made them much less stable firing platforms with a significant risk of foundering in rough seas.

French ironclads were also intended as deep water ships to patrol a worldwide empire. They lacked the major British flaw of having unarmored parts and were slightly better on manueverability and had slightly smaller draft. This led to to the French ships being top heavy and unstable firing platforms. In site of being top heavy, the gunports were sited too low making for a wet, uncomfortable ship, which was made worse by the first French ironclads using improperly cured wood.
 
A lot of Trent Warriors see their favorite side's ironclads as invincible, but they were actually all experimental and all had flaws. In addition to the problems you mention, HMS Warrior had a deep draft and was very unmanueverable. It was a deep water ship intended to patrol a worldwide empire, but in shallow coastal waters or riverine waters it would have been at a significant disadvantage.

Union ironclads were designed for coastal and riverine waters - in the open ocean their shallow draft would have made them much less stable firing platforms with a significant risk of foundering in rough seas.

French ironclads were also intended as deep water ships to patrol a worldwide empire. They lacked the major British flaw of having unarmored parts and were slightly better on manueverability and had slightly smaller draft. This led to to the French ships being top heavy and unstable firing platforms. In site of being top heavy, the gunports were sited too low making for a wet, uncomfortable ship, which was made worse by the first French ironclads using improperly cured wood.
None of that matters in the long run. Much like the frigate on frigate action during the War of 1812 the overall effect of either side sinking an ironclad will be small. What's more important is the whole Royal Navy smashing the Union blockade and enforcing it's own blockade in return, and that's something the Union can't contest with their ironclads.
 
being racist and owning slaves
I’m not at all championing the cause of the South here, but the South did not hold a monopoly on racism at all. Many northern states had Black Codes which were essentially a predecessor to Jim Crow, only without the right to vote. Also, the border states that stayed with the Union didn’t abolish slavery until 1865, nor did New Jersey. There was even a proposal from the former governor for New Jersey to secede from the Union and align itself with the Confederacy. Connecticut didn’t abolish slavery outright until 1848 and New Hampshire until 1857. Point being, just because the North’s hands were less dirty than the South doesn’t make them not dirty.

Anyway, I think the biggest overall mistake was violating Kentucky’s neutrality. The second the CSA invaded the state, whatever chances Kentucky had of seceding were thrown out the window. Had they not violated it, there’s a chance they could have joined the Confederacy if the Union were to somehow violate neutrality down the road or if pro-CSA sentiment builds up enough over time. This wouldn’t assure a Confederate victory in and of itself but it would reduce the numbers advantage the North had, if only somewhat.
 
In my view, the war could have been done better had the CS attempted its best to reframe the war as a war against the encroaching monied and corporate interest of Northern Industrial capital. During the war and immediately after, the most serious anti-Union or otherwise uniquely southern mentalities that took shape in politics were framed around a sort of Jeffersonian Southern socialism. The reason such an ideology and reframing would be efficient if performed well enough, is that it could have possibly had the effect of lowering Northern participation and possibly been able to take advantage of disunity in the Northern states.

In general, I am surprised considering the results of history in other lands in otl, that this did not happen otl after the CS lost. That is, dissatisfaction was extremely high in the poor communities of the South, who sought to overturn the order set forth by the US victory, not for the restoration of slavery of aristocratic economy, but more as a statement of revenge and against the general perceived trends of capitalist intrusion into the previously less economically involved rural poor across the South. This would have happened in otl if the rise if the Lost Cause mythos and the Bourbon-Redeemer styled Democrat did not occur or arise. If the former Southern elites and the middle class had went alongside the rural poor in a narrative of vengeance, instead of Lost Cause, the situation of the Union would be much different than otl.

Indeed, as @Skallagrim has discussed elsewhere, the Southern states possessed as its primary reason for secession, the notion that the South, for whom they held the US was founded for, was losing its grip on power in the US. The growth of Northern industrial cities through immigration and the expanding prowess of a nascent corporate interest frightened the Southern elites, who had for many decades prior dominated or at least held preeminence over the US institutions, especially the electoral college and the production of presidents. If we understand that the reasoning for their separatism was this fear of losing control and power, if the Southern leadership, especially the Fire-Eaters and so forth, can flip the reasoning into more broadly, an anti-urban and anti-capitalist (in the sense of the growing power of the major corporate entities) movement and revolution seeking to break the back of the US' infiltrating leadership, one may see that their ability to cause disunity in the US raise exponentially and likewise possibly expand its borders.

Generally, if the South wishes to succeed, in my view, the best way to do so is to find some way to break the US to pieces and this is the only way that I can imagine without enormous foreign assistance (which may not be enough) or the CS gains victories that would become legendary. Once the US is broken and defeated, the CS can then freely separate and live its southern visions, yet by opening the door on socialist styled rhetoric, the matter may become such that the CS leadership will lose authority in its own lands, as a tide of revolution sweeps across the US in a fervor of both unification and in wealth redistribution by the year 1910.
 
Technically not true. What was considered was Mediation and that's at least as much on the basis of containing Confederate demands for Maryland Kentucky and Missouri.

At least half the Cabinet was pro Union - including the Secretary for (?at) War. In fact what was considered was a cabinet discussion on the matter with Pam and Russell corresponding between August and November 62. The overall basis for the discussion would be that the war was unwinnable by either side therefore stop the pointless slaughter ( and open up cotton exports for sure) but the timing in relation to confederate victories as on the assumption that the Confederates would not accept mediation unless they were recognised as a state, and the US ( a friendly power as noted) would not agree to that unless it was forced into it. Slightly earlier Russell was pondering where the US woudl welcome the offer of Mediation as a way to save face in the face of military defeat.

But thats just to get the item on the Cabinet Agenda. With half the cabinet supporting the US for a variety of reasons, one of which was they supported the US.

After that you have Parliament

Yes I am indeed being less than fully encompassing in leaving out the Cabinet sympathies. So far as I'm aware only the Foreign Secretary Lord Russell and The Chancellor of the Exchequer Gladstone were fully pro-Southern in their sympathies, I'm aware Palmerston was pro-Southern in sympathy, but that never colored his pragmatic outlook on mediation. I think the Colonial Secretary had pro-Southern views, I can't speak for men like Granville, Lord Stanley, or Somerset on their views. Conrwell-Lewis and the Duke of Argyll were both pro-North in their outlook I'm aware.

Thank you or the notes on discussion of the offer of mediation in 1862, I'm more fuzzy on that compared to the notes on thinking about war in 1861-62 and the Roebuck proposal in 1863.
 
being racist and owning slaves
It seems to me that based off of the mobilization of manpower the South was able to accomplish, slavery was really not much of a drag.

Slaves in war can help in some ways (construction, transport, etc) and hurt in others (defection, Intel, etc) and this has been true since Sumerian times. The things that make slavery a net negative in wartime, like slave revolts or a serious need for policing the home front, for the South largely didn't happen. Overseers were a very small percentage of the population and their exemption from the draft was a piddling matter when you consider that the Confederacy mobilized men between 15 and 62 for war. The slaveowner exemption was unpopular but the truth is that slaveowners by and large ended up joining anyways, and were overrepresented in the Cavalry officer corps, for example, as the CSA often asked men to bring their own equipment.

Draft resistance was a much bigger net negative for them than slavery, as was overmobilization of crucial labor (and this was devastating when you consider the effects of the blockade; the treatment of Saltpeter miners for example laid this bare, as women would shame them for not joining up, but refused to take their place - honor culture was a major drag on the CSA in ways like this)

But if we are discussing Confederate shortfalls in the war, there are much bigger issues at play than criticisms of servile policy.

The failure to mobilize slaves into regiments until the very end of the war was a mistake, but even so, we cannot be sure how that would've gone had it been tried earlier on.

I think the biggest problem the Confederates had was a tendency to go on strategic offensives in the hopes of a knockout blow instead of realizing that time and war fatigue in the North was their best asset. They suffered grievous casualties in each of their major strategic offensives in 1862-1863 and made defense much harder than it should have been. The Iuka-Corinth campaign, the Heartland Offensive, the invasions of Maryland and Pennsylvania, all of these could have been much more limited affairs with measurable and attainable strategic goals. Instead, they ended in bloody battles and a more energized Union war effort.
 
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Thanks for your reply. You provided some very interesting data about Dupont, and the Springfield Arsenal . It sounds strange that Springfield would be dependent on British Iron, considering that Britain was basically the only power the U.S. had any plans of going to war with. No other power presented a serious threat.

The DuPont one is the most intriguing (as it makes sense since the US army was always very small), while the Springfield one is just baffling. I wouldn't have believed it myself if I hadn't read a source confirming that. The explanation seems to be that it was importing British iron because it had higher quality compared to iron and steel produced by American manufacturers. If war broke out, it's not an insurmountable problem, months of retooling to not crank out crappy barrels by wrecking the machines for sure, but one which could be tinkered with the depend on wholly American resources.

You provide a figure of 400,000 men for the size of the army that the Union could sustain in the 1861-62 timeframe, but it seems the army was larger then that.

Comparative Strength
Date
Union Total
Union Present
Union Absent
Confederates
Present
for Duty
Confederates
Aggregate
Present
Confederates
Present
& Absent
Confederates
Absent
Jan. 1, '6116,367
Regulars
14,663
Regulars
1704
Regulars
July 1, '61186,751183,5883163
Dec. 31, '61209,852258,680326,76868,088
Jan. 1, '62575,917527,20448,713
Mar. 31, '62637,126533,984103,142
June 30, '62169,943224,146328,049103,903
Dec. 31, '62253,208304,015449,439145,424
Jan. 1, '63918,191698,802219,389
Dec. 31, '63233,586277,970464,646186,676
Jan. 1, '64860,737611,250249,487
June 30, '64161,528194,764315,847121,083
Dec. 31, '65154,910196,016400,787204,771
Jan 1, '65959,460620,924338,536
1865125,994160,198358,692198,494
Mar. 31, '65980,086657,747 322,339
May 1, '651,000,516

I admit I was going off a return I saw from December 1861 from the Official Record where the number present is 477,000 so I just popped that off.

Granted the Union bought many small arms from the UK, and other European Powers, but loss of small arms in action, and need to replace old with more modern weapons created a veracious apatite for small arms. I think it would be hard to argue the Union war effort would fail without English Enfield sales.

Oh definitely not. The loss of British rifles would be an irritant, and them going into Confederate hands would be more so. It's not a war loser by itself, just a major irritant to arming the troops come 1862 as no more orders will be coming in from one source which was very profitable in terms of small arms.

War in 1862 would no doubt put the Union in a desperate situation, but the Trent Affair was resolved by handing 2 men over to Canadian Officials. After that Britain had little interest in a war with the United States. Yes the Americans never threatened war over recognizing the Confederacy, but they never did because it would strain relations, with the U.S. and gain them little. Selling warships would lead to serious repercussions. To argue that the British were maneuvered into the Alabama Claims belies the fact they were guilty of what the American accused them of. By willful negligence the British were selling warships to the Confederacy.

The British were scrupulously following their own laws when it came to building ships like the Florida and Alabama as the onus was on the American agents, not the private ship builders in Britain, to show beyond a doubt that these ships were being built for the Confederacy. In the case of the Laird Rams the British did have a duty to intervene once they found out that the ships were meant for the Confederacy, and they actually went above what was technically legal by seizing them outright.

As a counterpoint, no United States government would have reacted well at all had a private US company been building ostensibly merchant ships which could be converted into raiders, and the British be demanding the ships be seized. It's a pretty big reach into another nations domestic industry, and so the British, quite rightly by any legal standard, put the onus on the Union government to prove that these ships were being built for the Confederacy.
 
I’m not at all championing the cause of the South here, but the South did not hold a monopoly on racism at all. Many northern states had Black Codes which were essentially a predecessor to Jim Crow, only without the right to vote. Also, the border states that stayed with the Union didn’t abolish slavery until 1865, nor did New Jersey. There was even a proposal from the former governor for New Jersey to secede from the Union and align itself with the Confederacy. Connecticut didn’t abolish slavery outright until 1848 and New Hampshire until 1857. Point being, just because the North’s hands were less dirty than the South doesn’t make them not dirty.
That's technically true, but misleading. New Jersey had adopted a system whereby children born to slave mothers would enter into indentured servitude (until coming of age) in 1804. Connecticut did so in 1784. New New Hampshire did so in 1783. By the time slavery was abolished outright in the New Hampshire, Connecticut, and New Jersey, the overwhelming majority of black people in those states were not slaves.

Anyway, I think the biggest overall mistake was violating Kentucky’s neutrality. The second the CSA invaded the state, whatever chances Kentucky had of seceding were thrown out the window. Had they not violated it, there’s a chance they could have joined the Confederacy if the Union were to somehow violate neutrality down the road or if pro-CSA sentiment builds up enough over time. This wouldn’t assure a Confederate victory in and of itself but it would reduce the numbers advantage the North had, if only somewhat.
Kentucky had already voted to remain in the Union before the Confederacy invaded the state. The most heavily populated area was along the Ohio River, where people felt a great deal of kinship towards the midwest. The eastern portion of the state was dominated by mountain men with a similar attitude on secession to West Virginia.
 
That's technically true, but misleading. New Jersey had adopted a system whereby children born to slave mothers would enter into indentured servitude (until coming of age) in 1804. Connecticut did so in 1784. New New Hampshire did so in 1783. By the time slavery was abolished outright in the New Hampshire, Connecticut, and New Jersey, the overwhelming majority of black people in those states were not slaves.

Kentucky had already voted to remain in the Union before the Confederacy invaded the state. The most heavily populated area was along the Ohio River, where people felt a great deal of kinship towards the midwest. The eastern portion of the state was dominated by mountain men with a similar attitude on secession to West Virginia.

Kentucky's geographical position made it one of the most strategically vital States in the conflict. It also was, and still is the greatest horse breeding State in the U.S. Lincoln was once told by a group of clergymen visiting the White House that God was on his side. He answered he was pleased the Lord was on his side, but "I must have Kentucky."
 
The DuPont one is the most intriguing (as it makes sense since the US army was always very small), while the Springfield one is just baffling. I wouldn't have believed it myself if I hadn't read a source confirming that. The explanation seems to be that it was importing British iron because it had higher quality compared to iron and steel produced by American manufacturers. If war broke out, it's not an insurmountable problem, months of retooling to not crank out crappy barrels by wrecking the machines for sure, but one which could be tinkered with the depend on wholly American resources.



I admit I was going off a return I saw from December 1861 from the Official Record where the number present is 477,000 so I just popped that off.



Oh definitely not. The loss of British rifles would be an irritant, and them going into Confederate hands would be more so. It's not a war loser by itself, just a major irritant to arming the troops come 1862 as no more orders will be coming in from one source which was very profitable in terms of small arms.



The British were scrupulously following their own laws when it came to building ships like the Florida and Alabama as the onus was on the American agents, not the private ship builders in Britain, to show beyond a doubt that these ships were being built for the Confederacy. In the case of the Laird Rams the British did have a duty to intervene once they found out that the ships were meant for the Confederacy, and they actually went above what was technically legal by seizing them outright.

As a counterpoint, no United States government would have reacted well at all had a private US company been building ostensibly merchant ships which could be converted into raiders, and the British be demanding the ships be seized. It's a pretty big reach into another nations domestic industry, and so the British, quite rightly by any legal standard, put the onus on the Union government to prove that these ships were being built for the Confederacy.

That's an interesting legal argument. So a shipyard building a ship with extra heavy decks, to support heavy cannon, and gun ports wasn't a hint. That the American Agent told them it was a warship, and showed them the contract paper work was fraudulent still wasn't enough. Hey how could I know? You don't see what you don't want to see. That willful ignorance is what lost them the post war legal case.
 
That's an interesting legal argument. So a shipyard building a ship with extra heavy decks, to support heavy cannon, and gun ports wasn't a hint. That the American Agent told them it was a warship, and showed them the contract paper work was fraudulent still wasn't enough. Hey how could I know? You don't see what you don't want to see. That willful ignorance is what lost them the post war legal case.

The thing is, the Confederacy was using a legal loophole which was literally big enough to drive a warship through. They exploited English law by following the letter of the law and being correct enough (until the Laird Rams) that the British government never felt compelled to intervene because under their own laws they were correct. Any country could have done what the Confederacy was doing with the prevailing laws at the time.
 
Kentucky's geographical position made it one of the most strategically vital States in the conflict. It also was, and still is the greatest horse breeding State in the U.S. Lincoln was once told by a group of clergymen visiting the White House that God was on his side. He answered he was pleased the Lord was on his side, but "I must have Kentucky."

The struggle for Kentucky certainly was strategically important though it also took on the air of a personal tug of war between Davis and Lincoln.
 
By the beginning to the middle parts of the Civil War, the South was winning. They were inflicting casualties on the North and the crowd themselves considered voting Lincoln out of office should the next election come. But the CSA still lost.

Here is the question: what do you think did the Confederacy did wrong? Why did they still lose despite having a winning advantage from the start?
Does existing count?

What winning advantage?
 
If the goal was preserving slavery? Seceding. The US is too big to bully into abolition the way an independent confederacy is.

National independence? Seceding too late. They should have done it in 1850 or 1832, to avoid union industrial advantage.
 
If the goal was preserving slavery? Seceding. The US is too big to bully into abolition the way an independent confederacy is.

National independence? Seceding too late. They should have done it in 1850 or 1832, to avoid union industrial advantage.
On that second point, I wonder if any Southern power brokers in the early 19th century foresaw that their political dominance of the United States was quickly eroding.
 
On that second point, I wonder if any Southern power brokers in the early 19th century foresaw that their political dominance of the United States was quickly eroding.
Their arrogance and confidence in their own power prevented them from seeing it until it was too late.
When they finally saw that that was the reason they seceded
 
On that second point, I wonder if any Southern power brokers in the early 19th century foresaw that their political dominance of the United States was quickly eroding.
Good question. Nobody of enough importance did in time to secede earlier. Even 1856 might have been doable without a lincoln to rally the union.
 
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