If the Great War had started a decade later, how would the Great Powers' armed forces have looked in 1924? Of course, there were many things bubbling under the surface in OTL's 1914 (Russian and A-H potential instability, the Young Turks' consolidation of power in the OE after the Balkan Wars, etc.), but let's assume, for the sake of the argument, that the powers and regimes that took part in the war in OTL are still around in *1924 (even if the prewar *1924 alliances look different than the ones in 1914).
With an extra 10 years, probably not that different, it was military thought that progressed the most during the war. The application of already developed industry and science, supercharged with the equivalent of a century's worth of funding is mistaken for real progress when it just made enormous piles of mediocre kit.
The other thing to consider would be that for peace to be kept for a further decade then what would have to have occurred? The next Hague Peace conference was due 1915 and then another 1923 (every 7 years but the 1914 one had been delayed). The problems were understood at the time, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Sir Lewis Anthony Beaumont in preparing for the first Hague Conference in 1899 listed the practical difficulties of disarmament proposals:
(a) Disarmament is impossible without the assurance of a durable peace.
(b) A durable peace cannot be assured without adjustment of all differences such as Alsace, China, Egypt etc etc
(c) The adjustment of differences is impossible without a force to enforces the decrees of Congress.
(d) No such force exists.
The fact is that after a long peace each Power is prepared to fight for what it considers its legitimate aspirations. It will only yield when exhausted by war.
Churchill was working on a proposal in mid 1914 (he was invited to Kiel Week but didn't attend, the berth allocated to
Enchantress remained empty) and he worked up a four-point arms- control agenda.
- at the top of his list was a discussion of the building holiday proposal that had been on the table since 1912.
- room for agreement might exist with regard to limitations in the size of capital ships
- explore ways to reduce the danger of surprise attack - “the unwholesome concentration of fleets in Home Waters ” With a reduction in the readiness of the main British and German fleets to launch concentrated offensive strikes, both sides would have less to fear from the hair-trigger danger of surprise attack.
- development of confidence-building measures—that is, formal procedures for mutual inspections—which “would go a long way to stopping the espionage on both sides which is the continued cause of suspicion and ill-feeling ”
No genuine willingness existed on the part of the Kaiser or Tirpitz to reduce the naval program. Quite the reverse was actually the case; both wanted to make additions to German naval strength during the spring of 1914. The Kaiser, for instance, pressed for the construction of an extra battleship. Meanwhile, Tirpitz’s staff wanted to increase the readiness of the fleet, so that it could carry out a “lightning-fast offensive . To increase both the combat power of ships and the fleet’s readiness, Tirpitz asked for an extra 150–200 million marks over and above the budget already allotted. Bethmann Hollweg, citing both diplomatic and financial considerations, fended off these requests.
There were sufficient budget and physical constraints (3rd Lock at Wilhelmshaven) to restrict the size of German ships without a limitations treaty.
The RN was already resigned to a permanent 5 tempo beyond 1920. What worried them was the manning requirements for 90 capital ships. This is what the Germans and Austrians hoped for - forcing conscription on a peacetime Britain.
After 1920, there still isn't anything that an understanding with Germany can help with. The RN/IJN combine is still the most powerful. The British will rely on the French to moderate the Russians. The Germans will only sign up for an alliance and GB neutrality in Europe before looking at arms limitation, this was the position with the Haldane Mission in 1912.
I am particularly interested in the state of aviation. What do fighter/bomber aircraft, and air doctrine, look like in the mid-1920s without a Great War to test things? What about armored vehicles - do they get developed and fielded in numbers? In the naval sphere, do battlecruisers continue being built later than they were in OTL, and what would they look like if so? And aircraft carriers - which navies would be the first to field them, if any are built by *1924?
In early 1914, the RN had plans for 300 aircraft by 1918 with the UK ringed with airstations. They would be mostly flying boats of the Felixstowe type something big enough to carry cannon to take down Zeppelins. Note that incendiary bullets were illegal so cannons to out range machineguns on zeppelins would be needed. The RN would also have a force of rigid airships as they can carry greater payloads and loiter on patrol for days.
Seaplane carriers were a mobile form of the air stations and having the ability to operate wheeled planes will bring in a flight deck. I think most navies will have aircraft carriers by 1920.
For doctrine, you may find that bombing aircraft may be limited by treaty. You wont have an example of total war to justify the targeting of civilians/industry as per strategic bombing. Their advocates may be outcast and they certainly wont get the funding to build a dedicated airforce strategic bombing capability. As it was, the Royal Navy was the force that thought in terms of heavy bombers and strategic air campaigns - not the Army. To a degree this was the same with the German Navy as they targeted London with Navy Zeppelins.
The 'heavy battlecruiser' will morph into the fast Battleship, it will be replaced by the light battlecruiser in most navies as the technology will exist to propel battleship sized guns in either tactical or strategic speed at over 30 knots. From here they will then realise that the same mission can be done with smaller ships and larger number of smaller guns.
The proposed restructure of the RN in 1914 for the breakup of the Battlecruiser Fleet into mixed cruiser squadrons (essentially paired up 'Fleet Units') may see a return to 'divisional tactics' rather than Jutland style combat.
Much of the theory applied in WW1 had been worked out before 1914. Without war, the classic 'u-boat' was fully developed and matured by 1914. Compare the German U43 class designed pre-WW1 and under construction in 1914 with the later Type VII refined during the 1920's and 30's. Only in diving depth is there an appreciable difference.
Finally, what would the actual relative strengths of Great Power armed forces look like? I recall that Russia was rapidly modernizing its army in the early 1910s - would that continue to effect, if Russia has the resources? Would the US Navy keep expanding relative to European fleets, and would the European naval arms race cool down? And would France's bad demographics make its army less and less powerful relative to the German one, even with the three-year draft and without the bloodletting of our 1910s?
The Naval Race wasn't over or 'given up'. It was at 8:5 and accepted by both the British and Germans as such. Germany still had the Naval Law which requires 41 Battleships under 20 years of age. Germany had successfully pegged the RN's lead from 2 down to 1.6. From 1912, there was a defacto arms control agreement in place between the German and British Navies where both knew how the other would react to changes in their building plans. This gives a level of predictability to the arms race for the next 5 years. Since 1911, the construction budget has been steady at about £11m. The Navy had been funded by Federal debt which had added about 1 Billion RM to the burden since 1897.
The 1914-1918 programs were already dictated by law. From 1920 on it is Tirpitz's 3 tempo of 2BB and 1BC per year. The fleet will have 40 cruisers, 144 TB, 72 Subs and 101,500 men. Annual replacement programs will include 3 Capital ships, 2-3 Cruisers, 12 TB and 6 Subs per year. Between 1916 and 1920, Germany will ramp up to 12 submarines a year to fill the 72 sub quota. The estimated annual maintenance cost for the navy would be £23,000,000. This excludes a construction budget of about £12,000,000 per year.
By 1914 the global naval balance had settled on Squadrons (8 ships per squadron) of 5:3:3:2:2:1.5:1.5:1 ratio (GB:Ger:US:Fra:Rus:Jap:Ita:A-H) not that pre-WW1 nations would bind themselves to ratios in any treaty sort of way but the above was the 'sweet spot' for each power and how they 'fit' in the global system. This would probably hold for the next 5-10 years at least.
Navies are nation building exercises. You can’t show off armies internationally (if you do there are usually consequences) but navies represent your nation and culture at regattas and reviews. To instill national spirit 'school of the nation' internally the best way is 1000 dudes with rifles as it has further reach that just 100 in an artillery battery. This will continue to be the model for continental armies.
