Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

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EnglishCanuck

EnglishCanuck

For those curious, the next set of chapters will be up soon but here's what to expect in the coming weeks:

Chapters 37-39 Fair Shakes Pts 1-3

Chapter 40: Nine Pins at Island No. 10

Chapter 41: Across the Continent, When the Saints Go Marching In
 
Chapter 37: Fair Shakes Pt. 1
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    • EnglishCanuck

    EnglishCanuck

    Chapter 37: Fair Shakes Pt. 1​

    God save the South, God save the South,
    Her altars and firesides, God save the South!
    Now that the war is nigh, now that we arm to die,
    Chanting our battle cry, "Freedom or death!"
    Chanting our battle cry, "Freedom or death!"

    God be our shield, at home or afield,
    Stretch Thine arm over us, strengthen and save.
    What tho' they're three to one, forward each sire and son,
    Strike till the war is won, strike to the grave!
    Strike till the war is won, strike to the grave! – God Save the South, George Henry Miles, 1861

    “Lee’s first command of the Army of Northern Virginia, would not prove exceptional. Having taken command from an unfortunate Johnston, he would move to quickly try and strike a blow against the Federals. His first choice of target would be the seemingly exposed I Corps under Mansfield at Fredericksburg…

    Mansfield, at 58, was a career soldier. Entering the army in 1822 he had served with distinction in Mexico, being wounded and twice breveted for his actions in that war. His I Corps seen action at Centreville in June, and then again in September where it had been thrown from its defenses at Manassas Junction, but Mansfield, despite his continuing skepticism towards the volunteers, had reorganized them and been ordered to the relatively quiet posting at Fredericksburg, covering the extreme left of McClellan’s positions. He had entrenched his men on Stafford Heights, with guns covering the approach from the city of Fredericksburg and Falmouth…

    Joseph_K_Mansfield.jpg

    General Mansfield    ​

    …Lee determined that this task could be carried out by Smith’s Wing, and moved to personally oversee what he envisioned as a flanking assault to clear the way for his remaining wings to cross the Rappahannock and once again assault Manassas Junction. To further ensure his chances of success, he would dispatch Jackson to the Valley to drive the Federals out and weaken McClellan before hopefully pushing him north and into the entrenchments of Washington, leaving Lee superior in the field during the winter.

    Given Smith’s performance at First and Second Centreville, Lee decided he would need to act personally in order to see that the movement was carried out as he desired. Smith at this point was exhausted, worn, and thoroughly shaken by his experience at Second Centreville. Despite having gained a good reputation in Mexico, he was perhaps less than suited to leading what amounted to a corps level formation in the field. His health was failing, and he would spend much of the battle wracked with coughs from a cold he had caught in late October. He also resented the presence of Lee, who was his junior, and would prove less than accommodating. Lee found he would come to rely on Smith’s senior divisional commander, William Whiting.

    The two remaining division commanders, Theophilus Holmes and Robert Ransom, would prove less than satisfactory for Lee’s taste as well. Lee would direct Holmes to use pontoons to demonstrate against Falmouth in conjunction with an artillery bombardment directed from Marye’s Heights. Meanwhile, Whiting and Ransom would cross directly at Fredericksburg and storm the heights.

    The assaults would be led by Evander Law’s brigade from Whiting’s Division and Lewis Armisted’s brigade from Ransom’s division respectively. The two divisions would be engaged in emplacing pontoons before the beginning of the assault, and as such were tired, but reportedly ready, the next morning.

    The order to begin the assault passed down the line on the Morning of November 4th, and with a sudden cannonade, the Confederates rushed to the river, intending to carry the heights in a shock assault. However, Mansfield had not been blind to the goings on across the river, and as such his men were ready when the noise began to warm of an impending assault. The steady Confederate barrage provided some, if infrequent, illumination for Mansfield’s gunners to aim by, and they returned fire with gusto.

    Mansfield’s 1st Division under MG Isaac L. Stevens held the line directly facing Lee’s attack. Stevens had seen the hard fighting at first Centreville, and his brigades under Colonels Benjamin Christ, Daniel Leasure, and David Morrison, stood directly in the way of Law’s Division. Law’s men came roaring over the river and right into the guns, and were driven back. A second attack was driven back as well, until Whiting fed John Bell Hood’s Texas Brigade into the fray.

    Hood’s men were fierce, and despite the cannonade they too charged across the river. To the surprise of all present, they managed not only to scale the heights, but to engage Christ’s brigade directly, scattering the 50th Pennsylvania “like so many geese” according to one observer. They then proceeded to capture a battery of artillery, and drive off not one, but three counterattacks before being driven back across the Rappahannock, having suffered some 25% casualties. An astonished Whiting would ask:

    “Colonel Hood, what would you do if I ordered your men to go in again?” Hood thought for a moment before replying “Well sir I suppose this time we would swim the river and drive the Yankees off the whole ridge rather than one little piece.”

    220px-JohnBellHood.jpg

    John Bell Hood    ​

    Despite the Hood’s determined assault, no other attack could manage the same feat, and not a single foothold was gained despite fighting all morning. A disgusted Lee would call off the attack at noon and pull his men back to Marye’s Heights to regroup. He had suffered 6,000 casualties, and only inflicted some 2,000 on the Federal position. That evening, he demanded Smith’s resignation, which Smith gladly gave, returning to Richmond the next day. That evening a fuming Lee would promote Whiting to command the wing for his performance. However, it was in no position to launch another attack and Lee would have to reconsider his plans.

    With reports of stronger entrenchments at Centreville, and seeing the bloody repulse at Fredericksburg, he began to consider a new course of action. Clearly he could not simply dash himself on the Union trenches, and winter was coming. The army needed a victory, and to do so Lee needed to entice McClellan out of his defenses at Centreville and in to the open field where Lee stood a chance of defeating him. He called a council with his generals at Culpeper on the 9th of November, and it would be Magruder who provided him with the nucleus of an idea.

    If Washington were threatened, McClellan would have no choice but to move to intercept Lee before he could make an attack on the city. Both Longstreet and Lee pointed out they had no siege train at present which could hope to assault Washington and its much greater fortifications. Whiting contended an assault could be contemplated, but not with McClellan in the rear. Magruder realized as much, but, he added, Washington does not know that. Lee would see the merit in that plan.

    He would begin preparations for the crossing of the Rappahannock again on November 11th…” To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.
     
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    • Sceonn

    I hope there is greater reshuffling if Union Officers TTL, with the presence of the General Staff and the gravity of the situation. Although it seems grumblings about the way Washington is handling the war has already started.
     
    EnglishCanuck

    EnglishCanuck

    Sceonn said:
    I hope there is greater reshuffling if Union Officers TTL, with the presence of the General Staff and the gravity of the situation. Although it seems grumblings about the way Washington is handling the war has already started.
    Click to expand...

    In 1862 the Union is still undergoing its "teething" phase with the army. Men have been shuffled around where they've been needed and they've been appointed as needed based on merit or reputation and seniority. There isn't yet a general staff for the Union and the "Board of National Defense" is more of an advisory body meant to formulate plans and strategy (think of a very rough prototype of the Joint Chiefs) who offer advice to the now General in Chief Dix, who in turn advises Stanton and in his stead gives orders to the various Department commanders across the continent.

    Though if things don't go well into 1863, there might be some shuffling upcoming.

    There's been grumbling in the handling of the war, and alas it shall continue (as the Democrats will grumble even if things are going well) and with the Emancipation Proclamation now issued, its going to give them more things to grumble about. However, it has a very nice side effect of providing some material advantages and clearing up the tricky issue of contrabands. There's also the not so insignificant fact that those contrabands can now attempt to enlist if they so choose.
     
    Chapter 38: Fair Shakes Pt. 2
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    • EnglishCanuck

    EnglishCanuck

    Chapter 38: Fair Shakes Pt. 2​

    “If your enemy is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is temperamental, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.” – Sun Tzu

    “To prepare for the campaign which Lee intended to end the year, he transferred Hood’s new division from Whiting’s wing and placed it at the disposal of Magruder, while taking Huger’s division from Norfolk and adding it to Longstreet’s wing in order to keep each wing strong. He believed that at best Whiting could keep Mansfield in place at Fredericksburg and Jackson’s diversions in the Valley could draw off perhaps two corps, leaving McClellan with a numeric advantage. Lee did not intend to allow McClellan to use a numeric advantage, and would place himself on ground of his choosing where McClellan would have to attack him.

    Leaving only a brigade of cavalry behind, Lee dispatched Stuart on the 14th of November to make a reconnaissance in force of the Federal dispositions between the Rappahannock and Centreville. Once again Stuart would be excellent, riding rings around Stoneman’s cavalry and carrying out a three day reconnaissance in force before returning to Confederate lines. In doing so he drove Federal pickets from the north fork of the Rappahannock and across the Occoquan River, leaving a great hole in McClellan’s eyes south of Mannassas Junction. It was into this hole that Lee’s army would move…

    …Jackson’s movement up the Valley had driven Schenck’s division back towards Harper’s Ferry after the battle at Limestone Ridge[1], forcing throwing Schenck back on Charlestown and out of Virginia.

    McClellan dispatched the XII Corps and King’s 3rd Division from McDowell’s corps to stymy Jackson. Though they would first be stymied at the actions at Snicker’s Gap, Sigel soon led his troops north around Harper’s Ferry to mass at Charlestown and Leetown to counter any thrust Jackson might make…” The Fairfax Campaign, Jonas Walker, West Virginia Press, 1988

    “McClellan was, in those first weeks of November, totally blind to Lee’s movements. His cavalry screens had been hopelessly outmatched by Stuart, and his infantry pickets had been driven off in short sharp actions. When Lee crossed the Rappahannock McClellan expected Lee to attempt to maneuver around his right flank by aiming for Broadrun and upending his flank. Scattered reports that Lee had crossed at Weaversville seems to confirm this and he moved McDowell’s Corps to intercept while keeping Hooker and Porter’s Corps ready to act as the hammer to fall on Lee’s flank.

    To his surprise, Lee then arrived at Manassas Junction…”- I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing

    “The Federal works at Manassas Junction had been strengthened since the first battle in September. The earthworks that would become Fort Hamilton and Fort Heintzelman had been built up and strengthened by field guns serving in the embrasures, and earthworks had been dug all along the line from Woodworth farm to Tudor Hall and thence to Hope Farm…

    Magruder’s wing arrived in full force at the fortifications at Manassas. Drawing up for battle on the morning of November 21st Magruder had McClaw’s and Jones’s divisions arrayed with their artillery and opened a heavy bombardment all along the front. The bombardment was heavy, with skirmishing parties testing the flanks as far north as Pucket Farm. The resulting action was heavy, and costly, especially for Jones’s division as it marched into the teeth of Federal fire at Fort Heintzelman…

    Magruder’s theatrics served their purpose however, and in spreading his feints all along the line Longstreet’s wing was able to cross Bull Run at Yates Ford almost completely unnoticed. The state of Federal cavalry ensured that the Confederate screens were not pierced, even as Longstreet’s troops moved towards Fairfax Station…” The Fairfax Campaign, Jonas Walker, West Virginia Press, 1988

    John_B_Magruder.jpg

    The Prince of military theater, John B. Magruder    ​

    “News and alarms from Fairfax Station and his rear soon alerted McClellan to the danger. Magruder’s forces though, seemed to be standing on the offensive, continuing to demonstrate against Manassas Junction until the evening of the 22nd. McClellan soon understood, or assumed he did, Lee’s plan.

    His reaction was swift, and he sent scouting parties out in all directions, looking for Confederate forces as far north as Ashby’s Gap. Scouts reported little activity to his north, but the news from his south and east confirmed thick Confederate screens, which no matter how hotly pressed, could not be penetrated. In a moment of decision McClellan determined he must abandon his entrenchments and march out to confront Lee before he could place himself in the way of Washington. However, he could not leave his rear completely defenseless.

    He chose to take Hooker’s III Corps, Rosecrans V Corps, and Porter’s XIV Corps to the field, leaving McDowell’s weakened IV Corps to protect his rear at Centreville and observe his flanks, trusting Sigel to keep Jackson bottled up in the Valley. From there he marched his men due east, hoping to find Lee, before Lee found him…”- I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing

    “Longstreet’s wing, which had yet to see combat in the campaign, managed the march to across to Fairfax Court House without incident. Pickett’s division, preceded by Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry brigade, turned up the Little River Turnpike in the direction of Chantilly, his rear elements remaining at Germantown, but with Anderson’s division strung out along the road leading to Fairfax Courthouse. Magruder’s wing, exhausted from their fighting and a night march was even further behind, only Hood’s troops, eager to make their way to the fighting, managing to keep pace with Longstreet.

    Lee himself was established at Germantown, seeking a good position to give battle. He would unexpectedly find it at Chantilly on the 23rd…

    Pickett’s division would unexpectedly collide with Hooker’s III Corps. The opening skirmish would take place at Chantilly Church, where the leading elements of Sickle’s 3rd Division would clash with cavalry squadrons of Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade and those of James Archer’s brigade. Sickle’s, eager for a fight, pitched in to the Confederate advance guard at 3pm.

    McClellan had sent each corps scouting in a different direction. Hooker had taken the northward path up Saunders Road, while Porter had been sent up the middle, directing his troops up Chantilly Road, Rosecrans was marching up the Fairfax Road in the direction of Germantown…

    92822623.jpg

    McClellan seeks out Lee     ​

    Hooker received word that Sickles was engaged at the front and immediately scribbled a note to McClellan who was travelling with Porter: Sickles has met the enemy at Chantilly. Fighting. I am directing Third Corps to engage – Joe Hooker.

    This message reached McClellan’s command group at approximately 4:34pm, as Porter was reaching the unfinished rail bed. Reports of skirmishing along his front led McClellan to believe that he had found a Confederate line and he ordered Porter to bring his corps to formation to launch an assault, forming at a gap in the unfinished rail line. He sent word to Rosecrans to do the same.

    Longstreet meanwhile, was not yet prepared to engage an enemy force, with his men stretched along the Little River Turnpike and only now Hood’s division coming up into Germantown, with McClaw’s and Griffith’s not far behind. Jone’s division still seemed to be straggling in the rear, and Magruder expected them to be just behind Griffith’s. In reality, Jones had become lost in the night and was marching his troops further east than he thought, and come the morning of the 24th would have followed Braddock Road to Annandale, and as such would play no part in the coming battle.

    With the battle already beginning at Chantilly Church, Longstreet directed Pickett’s division to fall back on Ox Hill, and they had no trouble doing so, harried by Sickles all the way in a fighting retreat to Chantilly. He sent Huger’s men to fill the gap and form up along the Turnpike facing an expected Federal maneuver on the flank. Anderson’s men were placed in line next, also forming along the road, and Early’s troops were stretched almost to Germantown as they waited for Magruder to form up.

    Magruder, concerned for the lack of response from Jones’s division, brought Hood up to the heights above Germantown, and set McClaw’s to touch Early’s flank, while Griffith’s troops held the line at Germantown itself. Both sides set to digging batteries and seeking the approach of the enemy. Magruder would get a rude shock in the sudden appearance of Rosecran’s V Corps directly on his front.

    Rosecrans, receiving word from Ord’s 1st Division that there was an enemy force of unknown strength on his front, moved to deploy for battle. He had Ord’s men take the center, while Reno’s troops moved to link with Porter’s troops on the right. Whipple’s division was held in reserve…

    Sickle’s surprise encounter with Pickett’s wing had seen the brutal fighting at Chantilly Church drive Pickett’s men into Ox Hill. In an ill advised maneuver he attempted to bring his old “Excelsior Brigade” straight up to capture Ox Hill. In a confused twilight assault the men of the 70th through 74th New York went streaming up the slope, only to be pushed back down again in a confused melee as the Confederates opened fire at point blank range. By 5:00pm the fighting was over for the day as both sides, tired from marching and fighting maneuvered into line for the inevitable battle that would come on the morrow.

    As night fell, Hooker’s men occupied the left of the Federal line facing Ox Hill, and running up the rail grade, meeting Porter’s XIV Corps in the center. Sickle’s division was the extreme left of the line, with his headquarters at Chantilly Church, Kearney’s men were the troops holding the line reaching over to where Cox’s division began on Porter’s section of the line. Butterfield’s troops were held in reserve.

    Cox and Morrell’s divisions presented their front to Longstreet’s men, facing Huger, Anderson, and Early’s divisions, with Syke’s regulars as the reserve. Rosecrans, had Reno on Morrell’s flank, with Ord directly facing Griffith’s division. Tomorrow, both sides would engage.” The Fairfax Campaign, Jonas Walker, West Virginia Press, 1988

    -----

    1] The one in Virginia. Yes, it is confusing having another battle of Limestone Ridge so I decided to only allude to it!
     
  • Index

    • Khaine

    I gotta say I am cheering for the Confederates to pull trough in this TL, it is always fun to see a smaller US, even better if Canada can be expanded a bit more.
     

    SenatorChickpea

    Whereas I would say that it's always a happier timeline if the slaving bastards get hit harder and die in greater numbers.

    That'd be my preferred outcome, I suppose: The British win in the north, leaving Canada with another hilarious national myth like 1812, and the US takes out its frustration by truly demolishing the plantocracy.
     
    EnglishCanuck

    EnglishCanuck

    Darth_Kiryan said:
    I know its millard fillmore, but damn if you can't laugh and think its Alec Baldwin.
    Click to expand...

    Well a much older version of Alec Baldwin. I'm now imagining him in TTL's version of a comedy show playing Fillmore and trying to remind people exactly what Fillmore did. He is one of those forgotten presidents.
     
    Chapter 39: Fair Shakes Pt. 3
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    • EnglishCanuck

    EnglishCanuck

    Chapter 39: Fair Shakes Pt. 3​

    “In peace, there’s nothing so becomes a man,
    As modest stillness and humility:
    But when the blast of war blows in our ears,
    Then imitate the action of the tiger;
    Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood.” – Henry V, Act III, Scene I

    “Lee did not spend the night idle. He set Pendleton, his artillery chief, to emplacing batteries on Ox Hill, and the high ridge above Germantown. The men were ordered to make breastworks across the stretch of road, with rudimentary fighting positions constructed before they bedded down for the night. Men grumbled that the “King of Spades” was fretful, and angry assertions were that “Granny Lee” would not let them fight.

    On the contrary, Lee observed the rail grade offering the Federal forces protection from his musket and cannon fire, and determined his own men should have at least rudimentary protection of their own. It was hard going in the November weather, but all the men had bunked down by midnight with at least a chest high breastwork covering them.

    McClellan, seeing his initial advantage, ordered his men rested. He firmly believed that Lee had him outnumbered. In fact, absent Jones division and the casualties incurred at Manassas Junction, Lee had only some 54,000 men in his whole army. McClellan on the other hand had 70,000 men in the field facing Lee on the night of the 23rd. McClellan’s men were better rested, but still exhausted from the march and fighting of the previous day. However, it was ordered the men would stand to at dawn for an expected Confederate assault.

    None came.

    McClellan was at first perplexed, then worried by this seeming lack of activity and ordered probing attacks on Lee’s flanks at 7am.

    Hooker, who had his headquarters at Tuberville House, behind the rail grade, sent Sickle’s division once more forward. From 7:15 until 8am the rattle and roar of musketry and cannon could be heard as Sickles hurled his men into the teeth of the Confederate lines. He chose to bypass the town of Chantilly itself directing the press of his men again up the slopes, and again they were thrown back with heavy casualties so that by 9am Sickles was unable to continue his attacks, and Hooker was forced to rotate his division to the rear, and push Butterfield’s men into the line…

    On the right flank Ord advanced, but met with similar bloody results at the edges of Germantown, as the men of Griffith’s division fired from behind their breastworks. Rosecrans saw similar results with Sickle’s troopers on the extreme flank, even though his men would valiantly rally up the slope, not once or twice, but four times before the rebel fire grew too hot for them to stand and they would withdraw in surprisingly good order. Rosecrans himself came up to direct the second attack prepared for noon.

    McClellan, having seen the costly flanking probes, determined to open up with his artillery all along the line, before commencing one great push to try and dislodge the rebels with his reserves. After the battle he would write to his wife “against such great numbers, I had only one desperate hope that my superiority in guns could break the rebel line, and I might throw them back on their heels before Lee could bring his strength against me.”

    Lee though, had no significant reserve to commit. His line was long, but well defended with the desperate breastworks thrown up on the flank, and with Ox Hill and the high ground at Germantown straddling his flanks, he knew he could not have his flanks turned, but the center was another matter. Here the attacks had not been so fierce during the day, and with no terrain advantage, his men had only their basic breastworks to shield them, and a limited line of retreat up Wood Road past swampy ground which could only lead in a protracted chase to the north, and hopefully back through the Shenandoah Valley. Lee was aware, and made his commanders aware, that there could be no retreat from this position.

    The lull in the fighting allowed him to ride along the lines and inspect his troops, and with his flanks secure, he set Hood’s division down near the center. Hood’s men were his only reserve in case of a breakthrough, and Lee saw that there was no more likely place than a breakthrough in the center which might spell disaster…

    The Federal guns opened up at 12pm sharp, and the bombardment, with nearly one hundred guns, was long and protracted. “The ground shook with thunder, and the whole battlefield was soon shrouded as though in a fog” one Pennsylvania private wrote. Through the whole hour not a single Confederate gun responded, and many Union soldiers saw this as a sign that the bombardment was having its desired effect. McClellan too appears to have thought this, shared by reports form Hooker that great gouts of smoke were rising from Ox Hill, perhaps signaling that the Confederate guns were being put out of action.

    While it was true that on Ox Hill a cart of munitions did detonate form a Federal shell, in reality Pendleton had been ordered by Lee not to engage in a protracted artillery duel as they did not have the ammunition to outshoot the Federals.

    At 1pm the guns went silent, the bugles sounded, and the Federal troops formed up to attack. The attack would begin slightly earlier on the left with Hookers men (Butterfield and Kearny’s divisions), with the center then advancing under Porter’s XIV Corps (Cox and Morrell), and finally Rosecrans would lead Whipple and Reno’s divisions forward to try and force the slope.

    As expected, Hooker’s III Corps advanced relentlessly and persistently. Butterfield’s assault stalled on the sloped of Ox Hill, but Kearny led his men on. The one armed general waved his sword shouting “Follow me! I’m a one armed Jersey son of a bitch!” And with a cheer his men sprang forward, and slowly, surprisingly, braved the fire. Kearny, whose horse was soon shot out from under him, led the troops directly through little Chantilly and to the base of Ox Hill, where the Confederate guns could not be brought to bear. Under cover, his troops slowly crept forward, harried both by Pickett’s men and by the men in Huger’s division.

    Kearny%27s_Charge%2C_Battle_of_Chantilly.jpg

    Contrary to this 1863 print there was no lightning that day.    ​

    While Kearny discomforted the rebel line, Porter’s troops went forward. Cox’s division made slow progress against Huger, while Morrell faced off against Anderson’s troops. The advance in the center was slow, methodical, and grinding. Though Cox would briefly manage to reach the rebel earthworks, Huger’s counter attack threw him back with great casualties and soon Porter had to push the regulars into the line.

    On the right, Rosecrans divisions had less space to cross before meeting the rebel works and so dashed forward ahead of schedule as the barrage stopped rather than follow McClellan’s plan of attack. This bought them invaluable seconds as Griffith’s men were still hunkered down behind their breastworks when Whipple’s division came crashing over them like a blue tidal wave. Rosecran’s was there personally whipping the men on with desperate energy. They carried the hill before them, and soon were approaching the batteries that had yet to fire.

    It was there that the Confederates made their stand, just on the outskirts of Germantown. Griffith’s troops were retreating desperately when Lee, seeing his flank unexpectedly close to crumbling, threw Hood’s division into the fray. Hood did not disappoint as his Texans came screaming up the hill with a wild keening rebel yell that caught their adversaries completely off guard.

    It became a swirling melee over the guns of Cabell’s battery, and the two sides fought desperately. Hood himself would take a bullet in the arm, and Rosecrans would fight with desperate manic energy, as he rallied a unit of New Yorkers their colonels head would be taken off by a bullet and Rosecrans would spend the day splattered in blood. However, soon Hood’s counter attack told, and Rosecrans had no reserve, and was slowly forced back.

    In the center it was the same story, even with the steel of Sykes regulars, the rebels held their works, and as the guns on the heights were able to bring themselves to bear on the Federal infantry, they were forced to fall back towards the safety of the rail grade This slow withdrawal left behind a sea of dead and wounded men, unable to be withdrawn, and many trampled by their comrades as they retreated back the way they had come. Many would spend a cold night on the ground, and Confederate soldiers would find some in the process of freezing to death the next morning. Looking out over a field of blue corpses and writhing wounded, Lee would quip to Longstreet “It is well that war is so terrible, lest we become too fond of it.”

    The only notable exception was Kearny’s assault up the hill, where he remained until the order for a general withdrawal sounded. A furious Kearny would have to be physically dragged down the hill by his subordinates as he mouthed very insubordinate messages that were thankfully never relayed to McClellan.

    McClellan himself saw the attack failing and by 4pm he was pulling his men back to again receive a counter attack that would never come. With the light beginning fade, he would arrange for his troops to begin withdrawing back towards Centreville. He had disturbing reports of Confederates moving in his rear (exaggerated news of Jones’s division finally making its way back to Virginia in confusion) and at last believed he could not hold the field…” The Fairfax Campaign, Jonas Walker, West Virginia Press, 1988

    “McClellan’s night withdrawal left the Confederates in possession of the field and thus the Battle of Chantilly was technically a Confederate victory. Lee however, could not stay where he was. Winter was approaching and he had not the supplies to continue on, nor the numbers. Though he had inflicted some 15,000 casualties on McClellan, he had suffered 9,000 of his own, not counting those killed or wounded at the demonstrations against Manassas Junction. Though he believed he had given McClellan “a good whipping” he did not believe he had won a great victory and retreated back to Virginia in disappointment…” To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.
     
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