Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[EnglishCanuck]

Sounds like Lincoln is going to have one hell of a time to make peace with Britain considering the opposition at home and the likely British demands for territory.

It's an external and internal problem sadly. When the two sides finally sit down for talks, it will be very difficult to come to an immediate accord. Then depending on what Lincoln ends up signing away, well, he has a slim majority in the House to ratify any treaty.

The british public is still quite anti-slavery, right? I wonder if not taking a more radical stance on emancipation ultimately hampers his ability to make a separate piece with the confederacy.- If the USA seen as strongly anti-slavery might be seen as more preferable for it to be able to reconquer the south, than to ensure an independent CSA to weaken it.

while the british public being anti-slavery is true, they don't really matter during this time unfortunately. Them being anti-slavery didn't stop the British from trading and even allying with the Brazilians, Ottomans and several powers that followed slavery during this time.

As @Sārthākā says, it's not quite a simple as that. While the majority of people would be opposed to slavery on principle, the truth is that Lincoln could free every slave in Maryland, Kentucky, Delaware and Missouri and it wouldn't matter even remotely to the British people at this moment. Slavery would be an internal matter for the United States, the external matter in that they feel like the US has attacked them and brought them to war takes precedence. Now, the Emancipation Proclamation might see some push for a softer stance on the Union, but I'll cover that in a chapter in the near future.

One common misconception about the "British public" is that the mass of workers and city dwellers in the UK in this period had the vote, they did not. Even the Reform Act of 1867 only doubled the voting population of roughly over one million to over two million right away.

 

[generalurist]

Slavery would be an internal matter for the United States, the external matter in that they feel like the US has attacked them and brought them to war takes precedence.

True, slavery would be an internal US matter- but if the UK continues to prop up the CSA (materially, and/or by insisting on their independence in a peace deal) rather than just taking reparations for the external matter of the USA's (supposed) attack and going home with a separate peace, wouldn't they in that case be seen as intervening rather heavilly into the USA's "internal" matter of slavery?

 

[EnglishCanuck]

True, slavery would be an internal US matter- but if the UK continues to prop up the CSA (materially, and/or by insisting on their independence in a peace deal) rather than just taking reparations for the external matter of the USA's (supposed) attack and going home with a separate peace, wouldn't they in that case be seen as intervening rather heavilly into the USA's "internal" matter of slavery?

Surprisingly, probably not. There was for a while OTL a genuine cross social feeling - even in liberal circles - that helping the CSA achieve independence was akin to helping the Greeks achieve independence from the Ottomans or helping Belgium become an independent kingdom. Chock it up to the underdog effect. And, even this late in the game, the Union is still, legally speaking, a slave nation. Of course, that doesn't stop genuine abolitionists from pointing out the CSA is a self-proclaimed slave state and that the EP is obviously a step in the right direction. Those were all factors OTL, but in a situation where the UK is at war with the US, it's all less compelling and as objectionable as the CSA is from a moral perspective, from a strategic analysis TTL, a shattered US is arguably the preferred outcome.

That being said, it's not a universal consensus. Though I'll address that more in the British political chapter incoming. The issue of recognizing the CSA is not an easily divided line, much like opposition to the Lincoln administration.

 

[jwgview]

In realpolitik terms, which would be better for the UK? A USA forcibly reunited and therefore with all it's energy and attention focused inwards; or two nations - one powerfull and slightly antagonistic (USA) but also wary of the CSA which is looks on the UK as an ally. Even if a cold and distant one.

 

[jessicajsscjs]

In realpolitik terms, which would be better for the UK? A USA forcibly reunited and therefore with all it's energy and attention focused inwards; or two nations - one powerfull and slightly antagonistic (USA) but also wary of the CSA which is looks on the UK as an ally. Even if a cold and distant one.

The choice is a very clear one, the only problem is the cost (men and money) and the long term implications (a revanchist US and trade barriers).

But still, if the US is divided the UK has a shot and staying the global superpower indefinitely.

 

[jwgview]

To paraphrase others: Trade conquers all. The USA may not like it if the UK forces a peace that includes an independent South, or even concludes a separate peace but continues to provide support to the South. But in OTL, when the South's main economic weapon and inducement for European recognition (cotton) was minimized by blockade and increased production from Egypt and India, it was Northern industrial trade and investment that helped keep France and England neutral (among other reasons). So a USA/CSA split - England gets cotton from a friendly nation and the USA needs European investment to make good the cost of war. A reunited but internally divided nation - Britain isn't well liked (except for their money). so continues to profit from trade and doesn't have to worry about a new power on the world stage.

This is my supposition - does Britain need a reunited or a split USA?

 

[The Gunslinger]

I won't lie, I don't envy Lincoln right now. He's getting squeezed from both ends while trying to keep the economy from imploding.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

In realpolitik terms, which would be better for the UK? A USA forcibly reunited and therefore with all it's energy and attention focused inwards; or two nations - one powerfull and slightly antagonistic (USA) but also wary of the CSA which is looks on the UK as an ally. Even if a cold and distant one.

To paraphrase others: Trade conquers all. The USA may not like it if the UK forces a peace that includes an independent South, or even concludes a separate peace but continues to provide support to the South. But in OTL, when the South's main economic weapon and inducement for European recognition (cotton) was minimized by blockade and increased production from Egypt and India, it was Northern industrial trade and investment that helped keep France and England neutral (among other reasons). So a USA/CSA split - England gets cotton from a friendly nation and the USA needs European investment to make good the cost of war. A reunited but internally divided nation - Britain isn't well liked (except for their money). so continues to profit from trade and doesn't have to worry about a new power on the world stage.

Equally valid ideas.

This is my supposition - does Britain need a reunited or a split USA?

None at the time really know the answer! It may depend on how vindictive London feels at the peace table. Splitting the USA could have unintended consequences, but leaving it whole may simply create an enemy down the line.

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

None at the time really know the answer! It may depend on how vindictive London feels at the peace table. Splitting the USA could have unintended consequences, but leaving it whole may simply create an enemy down the line.

But will it be worthy it? What's to stop the Union of going on a reconquista war decades down the line with a much better prepared army and navy and larger population? If the British leave the americans to devour and digest the South it leaves them in a better position since they will be dealing with the nightmare of post civil war south, there will be bitterness for sure (fighting war does that to a nation) but it wouldn't be on the level if the UK tries to assure the CSA's independence.

 

[jwgview]

I don't think that England would push for an independent South as a part of their peace negotiations...I don't think but who knows. It's more likely that England would either continue material support for the CSA and/or try to negotiate a peace between the North and South. Which won't happen unless the South has major success in the field or the Peace Democrats take control of the government in the election. But the long game is trade - what would England see as their best interest? I don't think they can outright abandon the South even if they weren't an ally by treaty. The world would see Perfidious Albion abandoning the South for it's own interests. But, there's help and there's help. Peace with the North would mean the withdrawal of the navy from Northern shores but would that mean they stay along the South to enforce British trade with the South? Does Britain trade with the South based on credit or cash on the barrel head? Certainly after a peace with the North, trade would resume and who gets first choice on British trade goods?
I believe that with peace between the USA and the UK, Britain has an opportunity to greatly influence events towards an outcome to their benefit since the South needs them and the North wants them (even if the North doesn't realize just yet that they do want Britain).

 

[naraht]

But will it be worthy it? What's to stop the Union of going on a reconquista war decades down the line with a much better prepared army and navy and larger population? If the British leave the americans to devour and digest the South it leaves them in a better position since they will be dealing with the nightmare of post civil war south, there will be bitterness for sure (fighting war does that to a nation) but it wouldn't be on the level if the UK tries to assure the CSA's independence.

The question is whether the British realize that any rump United States that they leave (short of cutting the connected Free states into multiple countries) will still end up stronger than all of its neighbors within two generations...

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

The question is whether the British realize that any rump United States that they leave (short of cutting the connected Free states into multiple countries) will still end up stronger than all of its neighbors within two generations...

True, if they realize that they can spin the narrative in a certain manner that won't leave the americans as pissed in a way of "you did wrong and we were in the right to respond in a appropriate manner but let us resolve this in a gentleman's peace" something that paints them as the reasonable side that wants peace, with appropriate repartitions of course, despite the wrongdoing against them and that will make the americans look like unreasonable fools if they won't accept it and can leave in a such way that whatever resentment can be rationalized as something emotional.

 

[Not Henry G.]

I'm looking forward to Clememt Valladingham's post-war career. Maybe he'll write a series of novels about the US and CS banding together against Britain...

 

[EnglishCanuck]

But will it be worthy it? What's to stop the Union of going on a reconquista war decades down the line with a much better prepared army and navy and larger population? If the British leave the americans to devour and digest the South it leaves them in a better position since they will be dealing with the nightmare of post civil war south, there will be bitterness for sure (fighting war does that to a nation) but it wouldn't be on the level if the UK tries to assure the CSA's independence.

If Bismarck had been able to foresee the events of 1919 at Versailles, he may have been a bit less over the top in 1871 in proclaiming the German Empire and putting such a huge series of reparations in France. Similarly, if the makers of the Treaty of Versailles could have seen directly to 1939 and the years after, they too may have been less brutal in designing their own treaty.

The signers of the potential peace treaty here can't know what will happen with any certainty. Britain's politicians can only work with the knowledge they have and what they deem more essential to British interests. How that plays out in the future, well...

 

[EnglishCanuck]

The question is whether the British realize that any rump United States that they leave (short of cutting the connected Free states into multiple countries) will still end up stronger than all of its neighbors within two generations...

There were people who were reasonably aware that the United States had a lot of potential power at its disposal. Britain reasoned, not incorrectly from the knowledge they had, that the US was something of a military pigmy in the era, and so long as it was never powerful enough to challenge Britain at sea, they didn't have too much to worry about. In this period Britain is reasonably certain it can defend its own interests, but they don't know for certain that the "Dis-United States" will survive the conflict intact. It will depend very much on how much that belief propels them forward as to how they reckon with the US in the post-war world.

True, if they realize that they can spin the narrative in a certain manner that won't leave the americans as pissed in a way of "you did wrong and we were in the right to respond in a appropriate manner but let us resolve this in a gentleman's peace" something that paints them as the reasonable side that wants peace, with appropriate repartitions of course, despite the wrongdoing against them and that will make the americans look like unreasonable fools if they won't accept it and can leave in a such way that whatever resentment can be rationalized as something emotional.

Any peace deal signed will very much depend on how vindictive the British will be feeling when they draw up terms. They have things they know they want, as outlined in December 1861, and some things they may want more in the aftermath of the fighting. How that plays out, well we shall see! There's some big calculations in London at the moment.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 76: Discord in Dixie​

“Without firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should they make war on us we could bring the whole world to our feet … What would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years? I will not stop to depict what everyone can imagine, but this is certain: England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her, save the South. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares to make war upon it. Cotton is king.” - James Hammond to the United States Senate, March 4th, 1858

“Events from 1862 onwards would have suggested a great political accord in the nascent Confederate States of America. In actuality, almost from the beginning of the British entrance to the war, the politicians of the Confederacy had failed to find common purpose…” This Vast Southern Empire, Matteo Karp, 2002

“The British intervention into the war had, at first, seemed to validate the belief of many in King Cotton. It had long been a source, almost of Gospel, that the European powers would have to intervene to protect the South lest cotton starve their economies. Initially the British entry into the war suggested to many that their deliverance was at hand. “By the power of our Monarch [King Cotton] the powers of Europe now come to our deliverance. Had our doors remained closed even a few months more, the Old World would be upon its knees,” wrote Robert Rhett of the fire eating paper the Charleston Mercury shortly after the declaration of war in March 1862.

Cries of “Cotton is King” could be found in numerous newspapers. From Richmond rags to the presses of towns in Mississippi extolling the power of King Cotton. It was believed that the de-facto embargo by cotton growers and merchants in 1861 had worked[1], and this had forced Britain’s hand. Many assumed that France would soon follow suit in declaring war on the Union. The French landing in Mexico was seen as merely a polite feint to distract the Federal government before French forces marched into California.

Indeed, this belief was so strong that, upon their arrival in Europe, the seized representatives Mason and Slidell simply believed that they would be signing treaties within a fortnight of their disembarkment. While each man was suitably feted and interviewed in the salons and coffeehouses of Paris and London, neither would find themselves signing any treaties in 1862. For Slidell, he assumed this was merely a temporary setback. He needed to establish contacts, and use his fame to create influence, and he would devote considerable resources in the first year of British intervention to make friends at the Tuileries. It was thankfully a moment where the arc of history seemed to bend towards Slidell.

Mason however, would find himself consistently stonewalled. While he was treated as a cause celebre in London throughout the early months of 1862, his lack of political acumen, his inability to make inroads, and distrust from the Prime Minister, would see him make little progress. He was interviewed by Lord Russell in May, but then despite many entreaties for another interview he would be put off repeatedly. Attempts to obtain an invitation to one of Lord Palmerston’s Saturday gatherings at 94 Piccadilly all failed, and he usually only found enthusiastic support from merchants and members of the Lords.

Even Gladstone’s famous speech in Newcastle in October, failed to include Mason, and a despondent Mason would write to Judah Benjamin that he felt “far from useful to the cause,” and “a great irrelevance in this country” indeed would lament that, much like his predecessor Yancey had said “important as cotton is, it is not King in Europe.”

While Mason would flounder as a diplomat, the eager propagandist Henry Hotze would have much more luck influencing public opinion…” The Press is Mightier than the Sword: Henry Hotze and the Confederate Propaganda Machine in Europe 1861-1867, Emmanuel Robertson, Oxford Press, 1968

James Mason, the less than imposing Confederate envoy to Britain​

“Davis had been delighted by the British entrance into the war. Like many, his own assumption was that the British might do all the work, and the Union would be forced to capitulate. Much like his future co-belligerents in London, he was viciously disappointed, and the war continued…

In November 1862 Davis began to face mounting criticism for his handling of the year. Grant’s armies had begun pushing into Mississippi, Lee was no closer to Washington than before, and Davis had again increased taxes to pay for the war. Taxes might have been acceptable, but he stepped on the cherished notions of many of those had been most strident in pushing for secession, free trade.

Ostensibly one of the founding planks of the Confederacy was free trade, not the tariffs and other ‘ill gotten’ generation schemes that had been a hallmark of Northern merchants. The Morrill Tariff had been a factor in the dissension prior to secession, and that Davis now put a “war tariff’ on cotton being shipped out and goods coming in was seen as nothing less than rank despotism. Already in August of 1861 Congress had enacted a property tax on slaves, real estate, stock, bank deposits, and more, at the rate of fifty cents per $100 of assessed value. In the summer of 1862 this was raised to a rate of one dollar per $100 and in late 1863 Congress would raise that rate again.

For his part, Davis had hoped to not raise taxes, but the war had caused more disruption in the ability of the nation to collect its crucial cotton crop than anyone had anticipated. The crop of 1862, partially due to the self-imposed embargo of 1861 was nowhere near as profitable as expected, and by the end of 1863, with only half of the 1860 bumper crop, barely 2 million bales of cotton being exported, this was potentially disastrous for Confederate finances, especially as vessels leaving Confederate ports under Confederate flags were fair game for Union raiders. Without the profit from exporting cotton, the government would be required to raise revenues in much more direct intervention, putting their hands firmly in the pockets of their citizens. Going so far as to levy the work of the slavers property without due compensation in many cases. It served to generate much ire towards Richmond.

Richmond, 1862​

As 1862 rolled into 1863, this served to exacerbate a split in the Confederacy. States like Virginia, Tennessee and Arkansas which served as the front lines began to resent their “less accosted” sister states. While the governors of places like Florida, Louisiana and Texas were staunch Davis supporters, men like Governor Joseph Brown of Georgia, Senator Louis Wigfall of Texas and Robert Toombs of Georgia were staunchly anti-Davis. Wigfall and Davis had endured an extremely personal falling out in early 1862, while Toombs, briefly in the cabinet and a one time candidate for president, merely disliked Davis immensely and thought all of his decisions were wrong. Along with others, they formed a core group to try and challenge the government. Their dispersal however, meant that they could never coordinate properly, and in 1863 they had little leverage. Davis meanwhile, managed to cultivate the “battleground states” in Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky and Virginia. His own native Mississippi began to support him in the House as well after the events of 1863. Though this did not mean it was universal, men like Foote and Jemison, were outspoken critics of Davis to the bitter end.

This dispersal of his opponents though, meant that Davis could largely get what he desired in Richmond. Whether it was raising taxes, voting on military measures and impressment, or simply appointing government officers, Davis rarely faced concentrated opposition…

In the aftermath of the Siege of Washington Davis found himself without allies. Davis himself had been at the helm of negotiations between Admiral Milne, the British military attache Col. Freemantle, and General Lee. Putting as much weight behind it as he could, he had all but assured the nation of success. He could hardly be blamed for the failure of the plan. That of course, was precisely what his opponents believed however. Toombs in particular would curse Davis's "West Point mindset" as the cause for failure.

Jefferson’s man, James Seddon, who had been chosen more for his loyalty to Davis than any true competency, would ultimately be held responsible for the debacle and there would be calls for him to resign. It was in many ways unfair as Seddon himself had merely been the chief functionary overseeing the implementation of the plan, the planning itself ran from Davis offices, to the decks of Milne's flagship and Lee's headquarters in the field. Seddon possessed the singular misfortune to simply be too loyal to Davis, and had been picked by the man himself who many now blamed for the disaster. Though the more outspoken critics of Davis would call for the president’s impeachment, this was not seriously entertained in the halls of power or beyond the pages of the Mercury.

Having already been forced to shuffle his cabinet in 1862 in response to anger from Congress, Davis dug in his heels. He fought tooth and nail against suggestions that Seddon be forced from office, and even refused Seddon’s attempt to offer his resignation in November 1863. Davis would “not submit to popular outrage demanding the punishment of another loyal man who gives his utmost to the cause.”

Davis’s intransience only served to alienate him from his supporters in Congress, the Senate, but especially the press. Robert Rhett would fulminate in his Charleston Mercury that “Jefferson Davis is not only a dishonest man, but a liar, and in fact, the greatest traitor since Judas Iscariot!” While Reuben Davis of Mississippi would argue that “Had he discharged his duty with promptness, today the winter of our discontent would be glorious summer.”

This gave his opponents an opening they needed. Vice President Alexander Stephens, usually absent from Richmond outside House meetings due to his cantankerous relationship with the president, returned and began politicking. While he first approached men like Toombs and Wigfall, his perceived anti-partisan bias and pro-war stance allowed him to approach Davis supporters like Augustus Maxwell, William E. Simms, and Clement Clay, hoping to entice them to push for the removal of Seddon for “the good of the nation.”

Amazingly, Stephens’s politicking worked without Davis discovering it. Come December Davis could count on none of his usual allies, and Clay would inform him that “As Chief Executive, you may appoint whom you wish to the offices of the land, but this House is now set to refuse the confirmation of any man put to office you suggest.” Davis was privately furious, but he would be assured by Benjamin that this was only a small setback. Davis could, at the very least, attempt to steer who succeeded Seddon. However, both men suspected that this would only result in a long and drawn out political battle which would detract from the war effort. The president predicted that it would not be until well into 1864 that he would again have a man working for him from Mechanics Hall.

In a rare moment of unanimity, both Davis and the House would put forward the name of John C. Breckinridge. The former Vice President turned Senator and now successful general was well liked, had political connections in Kentucky, was a genuinely popular soldier, and much hay was made of his defeat of George Thomas at Elizabethtown the previous year[2]. In December he was invited to Richmond to take up this new posting and he was quickly confirmed.

This rare confluence of ideas managed to make Seddon’s forced resignation much less odious than it may have been, and Davis was even able to extend cordial invitations to men who had previously opposed him. Davis however, would not forget those who had schemed against him, and he packed his grudges away, sure to remember who had stood by him and who had opposed him…” Through Fire and Fury: The Davis Administration, William A. Davis, Random House, 1999

John C. Breckinridge, the new Confederate Secretary of War​

------
1] Believe it or not, this is real. People were so convinced of the power of "King Cotton" they shot themselves in the foot to try and force foreign governments to recognize the Confederacy. It didn't work.

2] He actually only won against a division not under Thomas's direct command, but it is much more exciting story telling for others to say it.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Unfortunately late, but I hope worth it!

 

[TimTurner]

1] Believe it or not, this is real. People were so convinced of the power of "King Cotton" they shot themselves in the foot to try and force foreign governments to recognize the Confederacy. It didn't work.

Getting a lot of shades of 'wishful thinking' here. I guess since cotton was the really only card they had in their hand, they pinned all their hopes on it.

 

[generalurist]

The Press is Mightier than the Sword: Henry Hotze and the Confederate Propaganda Machine in Europe 1861-1867, Emmanuel Robertson, Oxford Press, 1968

Interesting- this suggests that the War of Southern Aggression won't be decisively concluded until 1867- another three or four years from now! I'm guessing that sadly they will keep their independence.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Getting a lot of shades of 'wishful thinking' here. I guess since cotton was the really only card they had in their hand, they pinned all their hopes on it.

I opened with the quote I did for a reason. The amount of "pie in the sky" thinking about "King Cotton" informed the Confederate outlook to an absurd degree. But I think it was partially that, when all you have is one card you tend to play it a lot. They a cotton republic more than anything at the moment. Even with Mason's rather chilly reception in London here, there will be many who come away believing that King Cotton, rather than the Trent brought England into the war.

Interesting- this suggests that the War of Southern Aggression won't be decisively concluded until 1867- another three or four years from now! I'm guessing that sadly they will keep their independence.

I can neither confirm nor deny. But Hotze is going to have a big role to play in London for Chapter 78 in Britain!