Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[galileo-034]

Well France would never invade a North American country because of unpaid debts, right? Though more amusingly the ghosts of the French Revolution might be very amused at the irony of the nascent United States reneging on its debts to France and then having to pay up to get their own indemnity paid off.

Neveeeer ^^
Besides, it could be seen in Paris, as well in London, as an opportunity to slip into a position of strength on the American markets at reduced cost. It's like an investor buying depressed shares, knowing well that once they bounce back, they'll get a return far beyond their initial deposit. It looks to me as if the American market, its banks and industries, because of the issues of money supply, the currency rampant devaluation and the severe contraction in domestic lending capacities on top of the war indemnities leaves it incredibly vulnerable to the vultures sitting on the boards of British and French banks.
Let's hope this won't end like Germany having to deal with the burden of Versailles treaty reparations.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

By the time the US would default on the debts they'll be at peace (somehow) with the Confederates (either a peace treaty or conquest). And regardless, it would take a *while* for the US military to get even close to as weak as the Mexican one.

Oh France is much to tied up in Mexico to think about running another military operation in North America, but let's just say things like this make them more partial to a different outcome to OTL's Civil War happening. Not directly of course, but in a few chapters we'll see them take a stance and an indirect hand in issues which will be seriously important to the year 1864.

Neveeeer ^^
Besides, it could be seen in Paris, as well in London, as an opportunity to slip into a position of strength on the American markets at reduced cost. It's like an investor buying depressed shares, knowing well that once they bounce back, they'll get a return far beyond their initial deposit. It looks to me as if the American market, its banks and industries, because of the issues of money supply, the currency rampant devaluation and the severe contraction in domestic lending capacities on top of the war indemnities leaves it incredibly vulnerable to the vultures sitting on the boards of British and French banks.
Let's hope this won't end like Germany having to deal with the burden of Versailles treaty reparations.

I think that, with expanding markets and some of the richest gold deposits out West, the US won't quite reach Weimar Germany levels of problems, but the post-war years are going to be rough in ways that they weren't OTL. Economic instability will be the name of the game throughout the 1860s that's for certain. I already have a rogues gallery of hard and soft currency agitators lined up.

We won't see the America we're familiar with from OTL's late 1860s, nevermind the 1870s!

 

[Captain Seafort]

It's a nitpick, but shouldn't the treaty refer to Her Majesty's subjects, rather than citizens?

 

[EnglishCanuck]

It's a nitpick, but shouldn't the treaty refer to Her Majesty's subjects, rather than citizens?

You're correct! Was not really thinking about that when I wrote this!

 

[mundi_mundi]

Just caught up on all this, great work as always @EnglishCanuck! Reaching back a little bit to Ch 93, I do have one question:

London however, had more need of men to deal with the King Movement in New Zealand which had erupted into open conflict in late 1864 rather than an expanded presence on the West Coast of North America. However, that shall be dealt with in the following chapter…” – Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV

Is this basically going to be a delayed (but otherwise OTL) Invasion of the Waikato/2nd Taranaki War? Or have the butterflies done their thing and made this a substantively different conflict?

I understand if you want to keep quiet on this for the sake of a future update of course.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Just caught up on all this, great work as always @EnglishCanuck! Reaching back a little bit to Ch 93, I do have one question:

Is this basically going to be a delayed (but otherwise OTL) Invasion of the Waikato/2nd Taranaki War? Or have the butterflies done their thing and made this a substantively different conflict?

I understand if you want to keep quiet on this for the sake of a future update of course.

Well I won't be going too in depth for it, but it's subtly different ITL. It was a war of choice OTL and it is again here, with only a slight twist. I suppose that the butterflies flapping their wings in the Pacific will need some addressing again soon.

When I finish 1864 the "World in Review" chapter I've been picking away at is already split into two parts because of issues I'm covering, so why not make it a little longer to focus on some other things?

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 93: Half a Peace Part II​

“While it is not the goal of a historian to engage in the realm of the counterfactual, one does find themselves asking, could the United States have won their conflict against Britain? It is a question which has vexed historians and analysts for some time. Some, looking only to the example of 1775-83 or 1812-15 have said that it is unthinkable that the United States should have lost the conflict. After all, had not Washington and his forces fought a bloody and bitter campaign that ended in victory against Britain? While the leadership of James Madison and the legion of less than stellar commanders in 1812 had not performed as expected, even they had stalemated the forces of Britain to the point that a white peace could be signed.

These examples though, often overlook two important facts in each of those conflicts. In the first, a sizable peace party had already existed in Britain when the rebellion broke out in 1775. Then a mere two years later, the other premier powers of Europe had leapt in to take on Britain as she struggled for success in North America, widening the war and stretching Britain’s resources significantly. That the war went from one of a nation fighting a conflict against an internal rebellion to a more general European war overseas had a decisive effect on the victory of that conflict. For it was with French, guns, money and ships that the original Continental Congress was able to fight against the British.

In 1812 the North American war was little more than a sideshow. The titanic struggle against Napoleon occupied all of Britain’s resources and attention, and it was only in 1814 that major energies were turned to the war which ended in peace not long after a stalemate developed. Even today many argue whether the war might have gone longer, but neither party had a reason to continue the war itself. Defining the European balance of power was more important than defining borders in North America for British politicians in 1814. So long as Britain did not lose face, the conflict was of little major importance.

Though one can only speculate, an astute observer in 1861 would be hard pressed to say that a whole Union unsundered by Civil War would not have been a much greater foe for Great Britain, the United States found itself in the unfortunate circumstances of fighting a civil war combined with a foreign war. That Britain was herself undistracted, as she had been in the Revolution and the War of 1812, also lends a certain balance to the scale. Had another European power been willing to aid the United States then the question was more open, but in the 1860s as great wars forged the fates of nations and empires, Europe as a whole could pay little attention to matters in North America. From the start then, the United States was fighting on her own, without even incidental help from Europe.

Even a whole United States would have found the prospect challenging. The economy of Britain and her empire was three times greater than that of the whole of the United States. Her army was larger than the whole American army in 1861 by a factor of fifteen, and the naval establishment of the British Empire was simply astronomical as compared to its American counterpart. From the first day of the war then Britain held an industrial and military advantage the United States would have found difficult to overcome. With the Union then distracted by fighting an internal rebellion, this issue was merely amplified despite the existing military preparations that had been carried out beforehand.

Though half a million men were under arms in early 1862, they were faced by a quarter million Confederate soldiers in the same period. The outbreak of war with Britain meant that men and material which would have been better spent fighting the Confederacy was then shipped North to either protect the Union’s coasts or to invade Canada. In that same period Britain had mobilized some 147,000 Canadians and British troops in North America proper. While the Union Army would balloon to 600,000 men by the middle of 1862, they were still spread across the breadth of North America, unable to be concentrated at a decisive point to inflict a defeat on one foe or the other.

Some historians, though, have merely assessed the number of soldiers available to the Union and assumed that was all that mattered. Worse, some used it to draw an already miscellaneous conclusion; they assume that the American leadership was simply to incompetent to win such a war despite an overwhelming advantage in numbers. While some of these commentators are American, an unfortunate number are also English who cite the example of the more numerous, but overall incompetent, Russian commanders in the Crimean War as instructive of why this is. The theory goes that American commanders, unused to commanding large armies and large formations, simply broke down under the pressure and buckled with the strain, so too did her political leaders.

This analysis is unsatisfactory, not just because of the bigotry inherent in it, but because there are so many examples of American leaders performing feats of military genius in the war. The sadly unsung General Grant in the West may have faced many defeats, but he kept his army going well into the Overland Campaign of 1864 despite many terrible setbacks. General Burnside outfought the British Army of Canada at Saratoga despite being battered for months by General Dundas’s forces. On the seas Admiral Farragut proved the most dogged opponent of the Royal Navy in the time period. So foolish generalship or incompetence simply does not tell us why the United States had to sign an unfavorable peace.

The other analysis this suggests is simply a lack of political will. The theory goes that, had the United States been willing to be more draconian, more willing to enforce unity at home and accept horrendous losses in the field, then the war would have been won even if it had lasted longer. By 1864 they note, despite rising inflation, the United States was at last making returns on its great nitre farms to supply the army with powder and shot. Weapons were, to an extent, being manufactured at scale to keep the army and navy in the fight. It had a great drain on the economy yes, but nations had fought on through worse. A longer struggle may have been ruinous, but it would have brought ultimate victory. Some historians have looked at the numbers and suggested that had the United States been willing to accept the same crushing economic burdens the Entente powers did in the early 20th century then they would have ultimately prevailed. This ignores that Lincoln’s government had already taken many unprecedented acts to keep the nation afloat, from income taxes, social welfare, to an enormous national draft. That all these measures, unprecedented for the time, did not win the war against Britain alone suggest it was not a lack of will at all.

Even then, in later 1864…

From there, others have said the United States pursued the wrong strategy. There is some merit in this, but some critiques hold more weight than others. For instance, some have suggested that the United States could have passively sat on the defensive while Britain attacked and wasted her strength. These commentators forget that the British strategy of blockade would have been just as much a millstone around the neck of the United States in this scenario as in our own. Conversely, could Lincoln have survived the outrage of refusing to fight in Canada when, as was said at the time “American blood had been shed on American soil by Perfidious Albion” when the early invasion of Maine took place? Considering the criticism of his wartime handling of the war with Britain, it is doubtful he could have taken any other strategy than to attack.

That leaves the more reasonable explanation that the United States chose the wrong strategy in attacking Canada. Since the end of the war many had pointed out that the United States spread its forces too thin to accomplish much in Canada, citing similar problems to the strategy in the War of 1812. While attempts to invade across the St. Lawrence River ended after 1862 in favor of concentrating forces to hold what had been taken in Canada West, not enough forces were ever sent to be decisive in the one theater where it may have mattered, the capture of Montreal.

Many commentators have suggested merely masking Canada West while concentrating the greatest numbers of men possible against Canada East. Certainly General Halleck and General McClellan said as much after the war, convinced that it would have paved the way for a capture of Quebec, and thus forced Britain to the negotiating table. In hindsight of course, that may have been a war winning strategy, but no one may say so for sure. However, the same forces which could have turned the tide in Canada were so necessary for turning the tide on the Chesapeake in 1863 or blunting the Confederate invasions of Kentucky that same year.

With the political and military angles examined, this suggests to the author, as it has to other commentators, that the war was not unwinnable, but it was lost in the field where many military histories fear to tread, economics. As mentioned, the British Empire outstripped the economy of the United States by three to one. She was the workshop of the world in this period and, undistracted by other matters, she could turn her full energies to the war with the United States. And Britain did just that, using her overwhelming advantage at sea to great effect. Certainly many believed that this was where the war was lost, from Farragut himself, to later Alfred Thayer Maham and Theodore Roosevelt…” - The World on Fire: The Third Anlgo-American War, Ashley Grimes, 2009, Random House Publishing

Admiral Milne's abilities as a logistician were ultimately more important than the 'Nelson touch'​

“The thalassocracy has been seen, first by the ancient maritime powers, then the Dutch, then Britain, then Japan, as the true power that runs the world. Ultimately, that conclusion is what won the American War for Britain. Control of global sea lanes means that a nation can trade with and inhibit the trade of others with impunity. The Pax Britannica which persisted for nearly one hundred years from 1815-1912 showed the great boon that trade guaranteed or aided by a great naval power presented. It was a lesson which was not forgotten after the war, and it is exactly why the United States failed to deliver a great blow to Britain which might have won them the conflict.

Before the war Britain had a global naval presence that saw ships under the Union Jack stretching from the Baltic, to Cape Horn and the Straits of Malacca. There was not a place in the world where the guns of a British warship did not reach the coasts, even including the inland waters of North America! It was that mastery of the St. Lawrence River and then the Richelieu which made British dominance in Canada East so effective, and the United States was unable to effectively challenge that.

On the seas of course, the problem was much greater. Britain’s global presence meant she could track American commerce raiders and shut them out of her most valuable trade networks. That same global network of harbors and coaling bases meant her ships had the global reach, while those of the United States were forced to husband their resources and generally dampened the effectiveness of the Navy’s commerce raiding campaign[1]. Without coaling bases of her own, the United States was effectively tied to the Atlantic and the Caribbean, which was jointly contested at the time…

Ultimately however, Britain’s greatest weapon against the United States was not even her global naval presence, but the blockade. British leaders had believed that even if the United States occupied all of Canada, so long as they could not contest control of the seas they would have to hand over any territory taken at the peace table. Strangling American trade cut them off from foreign markets to buy or sell goods, and from supplies and capital which would have been greatly beneficial to the war effort.

The bottling up of the United States Navy also had an effect not dissimilar to the French Navy during the Napoleonic Wars. Stuck in port, unable to properly train as squadrons, the ability of the United States Navy to mount effective action against the Royal Navy was greatly diminished. The lack of experience in doing so before the war, demonstrated at the Battle of Key West in early 1862, and the lackluster performance of the general naval offensive in August of that year, showed squadrons not used to operating in tandem were not going to best the Royal Navy. An exceptional commander like Farragut could certainly manage it, but even his victories at Little Gull Island and Sandy Hook did little to change the strategic situation.

Fundamentally, the United States was unable to free itself from the shackles of the naval blockade which only became stronger as time went on. Britain devoted more ships and material to sealing up the American coasts which placed strain on the American economy and drove trade to a standstill, worsening the economic inflation that beset the country. For all that has been written about climactic battles like Sandy Hook or Snake Island, or the daring of individual ships commanders like those of Mohican and Kearsarge, the final calculus was that the Navy could not defeat Britain’s greatest weapon. Its inability to do so meant that the Confederacy, with uninterrupted access to the seas, could become stronger, while the United States, bogged down in campaigns in Maine and Canada, would grow correspondingly weaker.

It was Admiral Milne’s efficiency in coordinating these blockading squadrons, the supplies necessary to maintain them, and the rotation of men and ships that kept it strong which won the war. His strategy, while not the Nelson touch in battle some may have hoped for, proved effective in bringing the United States to the negotiating table. Coupled with the Confederate efforts on land, it was what drove the war to its ultimate conclusion…

While dull, it is an inescapable conclusion that British naval dominance is what helped drive the American economy under to the point it had to cease its war with Britain if it hoped to win its war against the Confederacy. The Third Anglo-American War was won at sea.” – Troubled Waters: The Anglo-American War at Sea, Michael Tielhard, Aurora Publishing, 2002

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1] This is, I think, a greatly overlooked point. The advent of the steam age meant that the same commerce raiding tactics the United States used in 1775-83 and 1812-15 were outdated and would have ultimately been ineffective even compared to their Confederate counterparts in the same period. The Confederates got the advantage of calling on neutral British ports, the Union don’t have that luxury, something I wrote about last year. Conversely, the British coaling bases the world over would OTL remain an advantage into the early 20th century, impacting the movement of Russian ships to Asia in 1905, while also constricting the movement of Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet” in 1907 which had to hire British colliers to allow itself to make its global tour! It wasn’t until warships switched to oil burning that Britain’s dominance of the seaways came under serious threat from anyone who wasn’t France.

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Though I’ve couched the ideas in this chapter from TTL historians, this does ultimately match up with how I think such a war would end. It is British naval dominance which allowed for the audacious Chesapeake Campaign leading to the Siege of Washington, and that was something an Anglo-Confederate force could absolutely have attempted in such a conflict. The naval aspect, I think, would have been decisive in how the campaigns were fought and the way the conflict with Britain would have shifted.

Of course, this isn’t to say that’s the only way it would end. The United States could have gotten some lucky breaks in 1862 or fought on well into 1865. There’s other ways it could go, but I do believe the macro advantages lay with Britain at this time.

 

[SenatorChickpea]

Those are a few great updates, but now all I really want is for the British to get a bloody nose in the Waikato War.

 

[the_Atom]

Why did Britain take so little in the peace deal? Surely they'd want, and be able to extract a bit more than three counties, a handful of islands and some fairly light reparations

 

[SenatorChickpea]

Why did Britain take so little in the peace deal? Surely they'd want, and be able to extract a bit more than three counties, a handful of islands and some fairly light reparations

I suspect that one of the US's biggest disadvantages in the war- the extent to which their economy was financed by the City of London- would become an advantage at the negotiating table. Not so much in terms of threatening to default on debts, because that bluff is easily called- Continental banks wouldn't step into the void if they thought that the Americans were prone to screwing over their creditors- but because the big London merchant houses would be absolutely desperate to get back to investing in the US.

 

[Young Augustus5598]

Why did Britain take so little in the peace deal? Surely they'd want, and be able to extract a bit more than three counties, a handful of islands and some fairly light reparations

There’s something to be said for a light peace. If you let a country up with minimal territorial losses and light reparations it makes it a lot harder to stir up hate or spark a revenge war but it also sets into the national psyche that you were beaten still.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Why did Britain take so little in the peace deal? Surely they'd want, and be able to extract a bit more than three counties, a handful of islands and some fairly light reparations

I suspect that one of the US's biggest disadvantages in the war- the extent to which their economy was financed by the City of London- would become an advantage at the negotiating table. Not so much in terms of threatening to default on debts, because that bluff is easily called- Continental banks wouldn't step into the void if they thought that the Americans were prone to screwing over their creditors- but because the big London merchant houses would be absolutely desperate to get back to investing in the US.

There’s something to be said for a light peace. If you let a country up with minimal territorial losses and light reparations it makes it a lot harder to stir up hate or spark a revenge war but it also sets into the national psyche that you were beaten still.

Much of the above, but also, just because you can do something is also not a big reason you should. The indemnity they demanded from the US is rather light, but coupled with the US's dire economic woes going to be harsh nonetheless. Even so, if Britain inflicted terms too harsh on the US the negotiators would have walked away from the table and the war would have continued, past the point Britain had achieved her own goals of protecting Canada and making the seas safe for British ships.

Slicing off that chunk of Maine, resolving the San Juan boundary dispute in their favor, while also showing they could beat the US in a fight is a positive outcome for London which 'corrects' some things they were immediately worried about, but also doesn't tie them down in new commitments or force them to leave big garrisons outside Canada proper.

The flip side is that, while Palmerston's own distaste for slavery means he doesn't want to be the midwife of the Confederacy (alongside other British leaders) they're also convinced the US is about to lose its' civil war too. So there's sort of a 'why kick a man when he's down' attitude in Whitehall as well. Coupled with emerging issues in Europe and Asia that could be addressed, Whitehall has a lot to look at as well.

 

[Grenadier]

Did Britain beat the US in a fight? The war ended with the British losing the last Sea and Land battle's and letting the US of really lightly , it just seems to be the same old thing again where this subject is concerned.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Did Britain beat the US in a fight? The war ended with the British losing the last Sea and Land battle's and letting the US of really lightly , it just seems to be the same old thing again where this subject is concerned.

Well, technically speaking they won the last land battle at Davenport Ridge. While the Battle of Sandy Hook was a US victory, it didn't accomplish much and was a pyrrhic one. Which will become a bit apparent in Chapter 94.

To be truthful, I don't think the British would want the harshest terms they could possibly get either, and even the ones set out here are much harsher than a US desired white peace. Monetary reparations, a more defended overland frontier to Canada, and the US basically saying "the war is our fault" fits with what I can sus out the British probably would have wanted in this period. Carving off big chunks of the US or trying to cripple them would be worth more blood and treasure versus a limited war with limited goals than anything else.

In mapping out the last of this part of the war I've looked less at battles won versus the overall strategic picture which, in line with what British figures of the time thought, the contest was one which would be won at sea. "While dull, it is an inescapable conclusion that British naval dominance is what helped drive the American economy under to the point it had to cease its war with Britain if it hoped to win its war against the Confederacy. The Third Anglo-American War was won at sea.” to quote the ITTL historian, which is broadly what I think would probably have happened.

Now, I could have written a TL where the US was just curbstomped from one end of the Americans to the other, but personally I would not have found that realistic nor just as importantly fun to write.

 

[Meshakhad]

This kind of peace settlement is also less likely to produce long-standing resentment in the US. Obviously, there will probably always be some people who will want the US to reclaim Washington County (or even the San Juan Islands) but within a generation or two, the sentiment will die down. Whereas if Britain had forced major territorial concessions, the chances of a revanchist USA coming after Britain in a few decades would be much higher. That said, I think it'll be a long time before Anglo-American relations become friendly again. Especially if the Confederacy survives.

 

[Icedaemon]

I think this treaty makes sense. Britain did not really want the war, nor did she have any specific large territory she desired enough to spend however much blood and gold on acquiring as might be necessary. Something near to a white peace wherein the USA takes full responsibility and pays some restitutions makes Britain look good and strong. There is indeed also the slavery question to consider.

 

[Nick@work]

So is the confederacy still defeated in this timeline?

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

This kind of peace settlement is also less likely to produce long-standing resentment in the US. Obviously, there will probably always be some people who will want the US to reclaim Washington County (or even the San Juan Islands) but within a generation or two, the sentiment will die down. Whereas if Britain had forced major territorial concessions, the chances of a revanchist USA coming after Britain in a few decades would be much higher. That said, I think it'll be a long time before Anglo-American relations become friendly again. Especially if the Confederacy survives.

Makes me think that punishment of Confederate generals and politicians will be much harsher than OTL with many of the high ranks being outright executed and the rest suffering slightly better punishments like losing their property entirely and being barred from office, both the public and government will be out for blood and will be feeling the sting of defeat, and since they can't go for another round against Britain(yet) they'll settle on taking out their pain and rage at the confederacy, especially since I imagine there will be feeling of "traitors allying with Perfidious Albion to kill good American boys and strip out land from our beautiful union we struggled so hard to acquire."

 

[EnglishCanuck]

This kind of peace settlement is also less likely to produce long-standing resentment in the US. Obviously, there will probably always be some people who will want the US to reclaim Washington County (or even the San Juan Islands) but within a generation or two, the sentiment will die down. Whereas if Britain had forced major territorial concessions, the chances of a revanchist USA coming after Britain in a few decades would be much higher. That said, I think it'll be a long time before Anglo-American relations become friendly again. Especially if the Confederacy survives.

Any Anglo-American conflict post-1812 would have less than ideal results for relations between the two nations. Here this is - from the British perspective - the third time in an almost unbroken fifty year cycle where the US has invaded Canada. Post-war British historical narrative making has a vested interest in portraying it as a war of aggression. On the flip side, many Americans will view the British intervention as a sucker punch when the nation was at its most vulnerable.

The next chapter will have yet more reasons for less than friendly feelings towards London, but also other European capitals.

I think this treaty makes sense. Britain did not really want the war, nor did she have any specific large territory she desired enough to spend however much blood and gold on acquiring as might be necessary. Something near to a white peace wherein the USA takes full responsibility and pays some restitutions makes Britain look good and strong. There is indeed also the slavery question to consider.

Thank you! My own research has led me to reflect that while slavery itself would not really have deterred Britain from war, it would probably have had just enough effect for Britain's leaders to steer clear of outright recognition of the Confederacy itself as a war goal. In extremis they might have pushed for that option, but I really don't see a military/political threat dire enough that Britain decides that it must bet its success on the Confederacy winning. From their perspective after all, it is all about protecting British sea supremacy and Canada.

So is the confederacy still defeated in this timeline?

Like much of the future TTL I hold that close to my chest. Though let us celebrate that July of OTL was the month the Confederacy died. Happy Gettysburg everyone! (Plus Vicksburg, plus Tullahoma).

 

[EnglishCanuck]

This chapter is slightly different to what I intended to post, but it will still be a bit of a "catch up" before I return to the Civil War situation on the Mississippi and the Chesapeake.